Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 37

Issue 1

Article 5

1-20-2010

The Supreme Court Lends States a Break: Department of Revenue
of Kentucky v. Davis and the Civic Responsibility Exception to the
Negative Commerce Clause
Ryan D. Wheeler

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Taxation-State and Local Commons

Recommended Citation
Ryan D. Wheeler The Supreme Court Lends States a Break: Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis
and the Civic Responsibility Exception to the Negative Commerce Clause, 37 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 1 (2010)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

The Supreme Court Lends States a
Break:
Department ofRevenue ofKentucky v.
Davis

and the Civic Responsibility Exception
to the Negative Commerce Clause
INTRODUCTION
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NEGATIVE COMMERCE
CLAUSE
III. FACTS
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Justice Souter's Majority Opinion
B. Justice Stevens's ConcurringOpinion
C. ChiefJusticeRoberts's ConcurrenceIn Part
D. Justice Scalia's ConcurrenceIn Part
E. Justice Thomas's Concurrence in Judgment
F. Justice Kennedy's Dissent
G Justice Alito's Dissent
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Legal Impact
B. Broad Impact
I.
II.

VI.

CONCLUSION

I. INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of all American states exempt the gains their residents
earn on in-state municipal bonds from personal state income tax' while

1. "A municipal bond is a debt obligation running from the issuing state to the bondholder."
Scott K. Attaway, The Case for Constitutional Discrimination in Taxation of Out-of-State Municipal
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simultaneously taxing the gains their residents eam on out-of-state
municipal bonds.2 States and municipalities have long issued bonds3 in
order to "finance everything from bridge repair to school construction and
water-system upgrades."
The current fiscal crisis afflicting the United
States increases the likelihood that municipal bonds will become even more
vital as states and cities seek solutions to their budget shortfalls. 5 The

Bonds, 76 B.U. L. REv. 737, 740 (1996).
2. See Adam Pekor, Department of Revenue v. Davis: Why the Supreme Court Should Strike
Down the Differential Tax Treatment of In-State and Out-of-State Municipal Bonds, 60 TAX LAW.
807, 807-08 (2007) (noting that forty-two states have some form of differential bond taxation
scheme). The rationale behind such a differential taxation scheme is found in Justice Souter's
opinion for the Court in Davis. When a state offers tax-exempt bonds, it is able to pay a lower rate
of interest on the principal while still remaining competitive in the market. See Dep't of Revenue of
Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1805 (2008). For example, a private issuer might sell a bond for
$10,000 with a 10% rate of retum. The gain on such a bond would be $1,000 before state income
tax. If a marginal rate of 25% is assumed, then the net gain for the individual bond buyer would be
$750. Under the differential taxation scheme, the state can issue a $10,000 bond, but pay only 7.5%
interest on the principal because the buyer of a municipal bond will not be forced to pay income tax
on the gain. Therefore, the 7.5% gain on the state-issued municipal bond would be $750, and
without any state income tax to pay, the net gain to the buyer is the same in either scenario. The
incentive to the state is the ability to save the hypothetical 2.5% interest on principal. See, e.g., id.
The desirability of a tax-free municipal bond may depend on the marginal income tax rate of the
potential bond buyer. In the example above, someone in a hypothetical 15% marginal income tax
rate would be better served by purchasing a bond from a private issuer paying 10% interest because
their taxes would only total $150, leaving a net gain of $850 (outperforming the tax-free municipal
bond by $100). Conversely, a tax payer in a hypothetical 35% marginal income tax rate would be
far better served by the municipal bond's net gain of $750, as a privately issued bond paying 10%
would only net $650.
3. See Attaway, supra note 1, at 740 (noting that states and municipalities often use municipal
bonds to fund large scale capital projects). Municipal bonds have been utilized in North America
since at least the 1740s when the colony of Massachusetts first issued bonds. See JOSEPH C. DALEY
ET AL., A GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL OFFICIAL STATEMENTS 4 n.3 (2d ed. Prentice Hall Law & Business

1990).
4. See G. Jeffrey MacDonald, Municipal Bonds. An Investment with Civic Pride, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1027/pl3s01-wmgn.html (stating
that, as of October 2008, the total market for municipal bonds totaled a staggering $2.66 trillion); see
also AUTHORIZED AND OUTSTANDING GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS, http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/
bonds/debt/200812/authorized.pdf (noting that the state of California has issued bonds to pay for
improvements for decades). California has issued bonds to fund school facilities, park and
recreation facilities, water improvements, correctional facilities, disaster preparedness, emergency
shelters, traffic reduction programs, passenger rail systems, coastal protection, stem cell research,
veterans' homes, fish and wildlife habitats, air quality improvements, and library construction. Id
As of December 1, 2008, California's long-term outstanding bonds totaled $56,944,224,000 with an
additional $56,830,314,000 in bonds that have been authorized but not yet issued. Id.
5. See MacDonald, supra note 4. For instance, in October of 2008, California successfully sold
four billion dollars in bonds in order to avoid a shutdown of the state government due to a budgetary
shortfall. Id. The state's need to sell bonds was so great that Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
appeared in ads urging Californians to buy the debt. Marc Lifsher, Federal debt-purchasing program
may exclude states, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at Cl, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008
/oct/09/business/fi-calbail9. Indeed, every state vigorously argued that the Court should allow the
differential taxation system to remain in place because the current bond system represents the best
way for states to finance many projects. Brief for the States of North Carolina et al. as Amici Curiae
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importance of the tax exemption for municipal bonds is clear-without it,
states and cities would be forced to raise the interest rates on their bonds in
order to compete with private issuers in a time when competition with the
private sector is already extremely difficult and states and cities are having
trouble selling debt due to the credit crunch.6
In Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, the Supreme Court of

the United States considered whether this differential taxation scheme,
which heavily affects the viability of municipal bonds, violates the negative
Commerce Clause.' George and Catherine Davis, residents of the state of
Kentucky, owned out-of-state municipal bonds and were forced to pay
income tax on their gains.' The Davises claimed that the state used its
taxing power to impermissibly discriminate against out-of-state bonds by
9
creating a financial incentive to purchase in-state bonds.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a highly fractured decision,
held that the Kentucky statute did not violate the negative Commerce
Clause.'o In so doing, Justice Souter, writing for the Court, reaffirmed and
clarified the Court's new civic responsibility exception" as first detailed in
In Support of Petitioners at 9, Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008) (No. 06666), 2007 WL 2115445. The States noted that "[t]he tax exemption not only allows States to obtain
more favorable financing terms, it also gives States the option of borrowing greater sums without
jeopardizing their credit ratings." Id at 10. The States warned that the cost of borrowing money
would become unacceptably high if they were unable to maintain their credit ratings. Id. As the
system is currently set up, the bonds "allow States to undertake necessary capital improvements
without having to impose exorbitant taxes, [and] they also allow States to spread the cost of the
project over its life." Id. at 9.
6. See, e.g., tan Salisbury, Home-State Muni Funds Carry Risks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2009,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123198481288484261.html (noting that "[t]he credit
crisis has made muni yields unusually attractive. Vanguard Intermediate-Term Tax-Exempt Fund,
one that several advisers cited for its low costs, currently yields about 3.7%, well above the 1.6%
yield on five-year Treasurys."). However, the risks of investing in a municipal bond are even greater
today because while it is still unlikely that a municipal bond will default, "investors can see
significant losses if a state's bonds are downgraded by ratings agencies." Id Despite a perceived
increased risk in municipal bonds, Bill Lockyear, the state treasurer of California, stated that "[t]he
only way we're going to default is if there's a thermonuclear war." Brett Arends, The Golden
State's Golden Buying Opportunity?,WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 123
144936055465507.html.
7. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1801 (2008). For more on the negative Commerce Clause, see infra
notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
8. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1807.
9. Id. Specifically, Kentucky exempts income tax on gains derived from in-state bonds while
"interest income derived from obligations of sister states and political subdivisions thereof," remains
taxable income. See KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 141.010(l0)(c) (West 2006).
10. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1819.
I1. The name "civic responsibility exception" was coined by the author. In both Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Souter's formulation of the rule, the key to immunity is that the government
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United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management

Authority.' 2 In United Haulers, the Court held that state and local laws may
favor the government so long as all private in-state and out-of-state
businesses are treated exactly the same." In addition to the precedent from
United Haulers,Justice Souter went as far as to say that Kentucky's issuance
and taxation of bonds falls under the market participant doctrine.14
However, this portion of his opinion did not gain the majority of the Court's
favor.' 5 In addition, Justice Souter, again writing for the majority, declined
to apply the Pike balancing test at all, stating that the judiciary is an
unsuitable forum in which to weigh the advantages and the disadvantages of
such a differential taxation scheme, and instead showed a strong preference
to defer to elected legislators to make such decisions.1 6 By holding that
these differential taxation schemes do not violate the negative Commerce
Clause, has the Roberts Court signaled both an increasing preference toward
federalism while simultaneously suggesting that courts should be deferential
to the various legislative bodies and those bodies' balancing of competing
policy interests?
This case note will discuss the Court's adoption of the new civic
responsibility exception to the negative Commerce Clause, with particular
entity must have enacted the statute in question in order to further a traditional government activity,
which essentially boils down to a government's civic responsibility. Harvard Law Review suggests
the phrase "government entity exemption" to describe the Court's new exception to the negative
Commerce Clause. See Dormant Commerce Clause-State Taxation of Municipal Bonds, 122
HARV. L. REv. 276, 276 (2008). However, "government entity exemption" does not properly
characterize the exception. Indeed, the phrase is too broad and could easily engulf the market
participant doctrine as a government entity necessarily acts whenever the market participant doctrine
applies. In addition, when the UnitedHaulers and Davis exception applies, it will not always be the
case that a government entity will be exempted simply because of its character as a governmental
institution. Rather, it is what the government does that matters, in that the government must be
pursuing a traditional government function in furtherance of its civic responsibilities while treating
all private in-state and out-of-state businesses the same. Thus "civic responsibility exception"
denotes the rule much more appropriately.
12. Id. at 276-77; see United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127
S. Ct. 1786, 1795 (2007).
13. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795; Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811 ("Just like the ordinances
upheld there, Kentucky's tax exemption favors a traditional government function without any
differential treatment favoring local entities over substantially similar out-of-state interests."). For
more on United Haulers, see infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
14. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at l811-14.
15. Id. at 1804, 1811-17. The Chief Justice summarizes his analysis on the prudence of applying
the market participant doctrine in this specific instance by stating that "[i]n my view, the case is
readily resolved by last Term's decision in United Haulers." Id. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring
in part); see also infra note 120 and accompanying text.
16. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1818 (majority opinion) ("What is most significant about these costbenefit questions is not even the difficulty of answering them or the inevitable uncertainty of the
predictions that might be made in trying to come up with answers, but the unsuitability of the
judicial process and judicial forums for making whatever predictions and reaching whatever answers
are possible at all."); see infra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
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emphasis on the Court's analysis in reaching that conclusion, the Court's
preference for federalism, its hesitance to apply the Pike balancing test, and
its uncertainty with regard to the interplay between the market participant
doctrine and the civic responsibility exception. Part II will explore the
history of the negative Commerce Clause and trace the Court's development
of the relevant tests which determine when the Clause has been violated."
Part III will detail the facts of Department of Revenue of Kentucky v.

Davis.1" Part IV 9 will analyze all seven opinions, starting with the majority
opinion by Justice Souter;20 concurrences by Justice Stevens,21 Chief Justice
Roberts,2 2 Justice Scalia,23 and Justice Thomas; 24 and finally dissents by
Justices Kennedy25 and Alito. 26 Part V will explore both the legal and
broader consequences of this decision.27 Finally, Part VI will conclude the
case note.28
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE

The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution gives Congress
the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 29 Out of the Commerce Clause,
the Supreme Court found an implicit limit on the states' ability to regulate
commerce, whether or not Congress previously legislated on an issue.30
17. See infra notes 29-64 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 73-167 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 73-113 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 114-118 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 121-127 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 128-134 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 135-165 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 168-188 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
29. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 3.
30. The negative Commerce Clause first became an accepted theory in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant
Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 577 (1987).
In Cooley, the Court considered whether a Pennsylvania statute that required boats entering or
exiting Philadelphia's port to use a local pilot violated the Commerce Clause. Id (citing Cooley, 53
U.S. (12 How.) at 311-12). Justice Curtis, writing for the Court and upholding the statute, decided
that Congress did not have exclusive control over commerce in the Constitution because Congress
had, in the past, delegated powers over commerce to the states. Id. at 577-78 (citing Cooley, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) at 317-18). To some degree, Justice Curtis' motivations in ruling that the states had some
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Despite heavy criticism from some members of the Court,3 ' the negative
Commerce Clause remains an established doctrine today. 32
power over commerce may have been political. Id. at 579 ("[H]e struck a pre-Civil War judicial
compromise. His approach simultaneously avoided confrontation with states' rights advocates, yet
reserved for the Court the ability to invalidate objectionable state legislation under a theory of
partial exclusivity."). Modernly, the Court has applied a version of the negative Commerce Clause
which focuses upon the limits on states to act in a protectionist nature. See New Energy Co. of Ind.
v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988) ("It has long been accepted that the Commerce Clause not
only grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce among the States, but also directly limits
the power of the States to discriminate against interstate commerce."); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S.
249, 252 (1946) ("[T]he Commerce Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a
limitation upon the power of the States."). Support for an interpretation of the Constitution under
which the states should be limited in their ability to regulate commerce, even where Congress has
remained silent, includes an argument from Alexander Hamilton that:
The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention [among the
states]. The states less favourably circumstanced, would be desirous of escaping from the
disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate
neighbours. Each state, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial
polity peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions,
which would beget discontent.
THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 28-29 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds.,
Liberty Fund, Inc. 2001) (1787). Interestingly, the Supreme Court has stated that the Commerce
Clause, an enumerated federal power, "also had immediately effected a curtailment of state power."
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571 (1997). Both the words
"dormant" and "negative" have been used to describe this unenumerated federal power. Id. at 609
n.I (Thomas, J., dissenting). This note will use the term "negative," for as Justice Scalia wryly
commented, "the 'negative Commerce Clause' . . . is 'negative' not only because it negates state
regulation of commerce, but also because it does not appear in the Constitution." Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
31. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1799
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the Constitution
and has proved unworkable in practice."); Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Our cases have struggled (to put it nicely) to develop a set of rules by which we may preserve a
national market without needlessly intruding upon the States' police powers, each exercise of which
no doubt has some effect on the commerce of the Nation."); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S.
278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he so-called 'negative' Commerce Clause is an
unjustified judicial invention, not to be expanded beyond its existing domain."). The Court is not
alone in its criticisms of the negative Commerce Clause. Some commentators have suggested that it
is not the Court's role to determine when a state has overstepped its boundary because "[u]nder the
dormant commerce clause, the federal judiciary-the organ of the federal government most insulated
from state influence and the organ traditionally feared most by the states-makes the initial
legislative judgment whether state regulation of interstate commerce is reasonable." Redish, supra
note 30, at 573 (footnote omitted).
32. As Justice Clark stated, "[fjrom the quagmire there emerge. . . some firm peaks of decision
which remain unquestioned." Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458
(1959). Even Justice Scalia has been willing to apply the negative Commerce Clause in situations
where stare decisis demands that he do so. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1798 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("I have been willing to enforce on stare decisis grounds a 'negative' self-executing
Commerce Clause in two situations: (1) against a state law that facially discriminates against
interstate commerce, and (2) against a state law that is indistinguishable from a type of law
previously held unconstitutional by the Court."). Indeed, it appears that only Justice Thomas is
categorically unwilling to apply the negative Commerce Clause. Id. at 1799 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("As the debate between the majority and dissent shows, application of the negative
Commerce Clause turns solely on policy considerations, not on the Constitution. Because this Court
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In order to determine whether a state statute violates the negative
Commerce Clause, the modem Court first determines whether or not the
challenged statute discriminates against only out-of-state commerce. For
example, in City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey, a New Jersey statute which

prohibited the importation of almost all solid or liquid waste into the state
was challenged by private landfill operators and cities in other states. 34 The
Court noted that "where simple economic protectionism is effected by state
legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected."35 The
Court reasoned that because New Jersey only prohibited the importation of
waste from out-of-state sources while still allowing landfills to process New
Jersey waste, the law was facially discriminatory. In concluding, the Court
distinguished the garbage import ban from quarantine laws and held that the
New Jersey statute violated the negative Commerce Clause.

has no policy role in regulating interstate commerce, I would discard the Court's negative
Commerce Clause jurisprudence."); see infra notes 123-130 and accompanying text.
33. See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). Justice Stewart wrote that "[t]he
crucial inquiry, therefore, must be directed to determining whether [the statute] is basically a
protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local
concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental." Id.
34. Id. at 618-19. The New Jersey statute did contain an exception that allowed the importation
of garbage which would be used to feed animals; waste material which would be recycled; waste
which could be used as a secondary material; and hazardous waste which was to be treated,
processed and recovered by a facility in New Jersey. Id. at 619 n.2. After the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the challenged statute was not a violation of the Commerce Clause, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 620.
35. Id. at 624. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, observed that the clearest example of such
a regulation would be one which simply blocked the flow of commerce at a state's border. Id. A
discriminatory law will thus only be found constitutionally valid if it 'advances a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives."' Or. Waste
Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994) (quoting New Energy, 486 U.S.
at 278). However, the bar for a facially discriminatory law to pass constitutional muster has been set
high. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma, stated that "facial
discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect, regardless of the State's purpose, . . . [and] [a]t a
minimum such facial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local
purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
337 (1979) (footnote and citation omitted).
36. Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 626-28. The state claimed that the statute was not designed to
protect the state economically, but rather was intended to protect the state's environment by
lessening the need to create new landfill sites, and, further, that this slight burden on interstate
commerce was outweighed by the local benefits of environmental protection. Id. at 625. The Court,
however, did not find the supposed intent of the statute compelling. Id at 626-27 ("But whatever
New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of
commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat
them differently.").
37. Id. at 629. The state argued that the Supreme Court had, in the past, allowed facially
discriminatory quarantine laws to pass Constitutional muster. Id. at 628. However, Justice Stewart
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While Philadelphiaprovides the standard for cases in which a statute is
facially discriminatory, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. represents the Court's
application of the negative Commerce Clause to the situation in which there
is no discrimination for the forbidden purpose of economic protectionism.
In Pike, the Court considered an Arizona statute that required fruit and
vegetables grown in Arizona to be packaged in-state before being
transported out-of-state. 39 The Court stated a general rule that, when a
statute regulates evenhandedly, it will be upheld unless the burden on
commerce outweighs the local benefit.4 0 In Pike, the heavy financial burden
of forcing the producer to build an entirely new packaging plant in Arizona
was found to outweigh the slight benefit of packaging according to
Arizona's standards, and therefore the statute was found to violate the
negative Commerce Clause.4 1

stated that those quarantine laws, banning things such as diseased cattle, "did not discriminate
against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever their
origin." Id. at 629. In contrast, the New Jersey law simply erected a trade barrier, as there was no
logical reason to ban out-of-state waste while still allowing the transportation of in-state waste. Id.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, characterized the Court's holding as an unacceptable
Hobson's choice of either accepting waste from all of the other states or shutting down its landfills
such that both out-of-state and in-state waste could not be disposed of efficiently. Id at 631
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist found merit to the state's argument that the New
Jersey statute was akin to a constitutionally valid quarantine law, noting that there is "no way to
distinguish solid waste, on the record of this case, from germ-infected rags, diseased meat, and other
noxious items." Id. at 632.
38. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
39. Id at 138. A California fruit company, which grew cantaloupes in Arizona, challenged the
statute as a violation of the negative Commerce Clause. Id The company had extensive packaging
facilities already built thirty-one miles away in California, and thus wished to package its goods at
its California facility rather than be forced to construct a new packaging facility in Arizona. Id. at
139-40. Arizona argued that all it wanted to regulate was the intrastatepackaging of goods, which
would take place before the goods entered the interstate market. Id. at 140. According to the state,
the primary purpose of the act was "to promote and preserve the reputation of Arizona growers by
prohibiting deceptive packaging." Id at 143. Arizona's fear was that some growers would package
inferior fruits or vegetables, resulting in an adverse effect on the reputation of all Arizona growers.
Id.
40. Id. at 142. Justice Stewart's now famous Pike balancing test, in whole, is as follows:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of
the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.
Id. (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 145. In this case, given that the quality of cantaloupes grown was very high, the Court
found that the state interest in requiring packaging in Arizona was simply to inform consumers that
Arizona produced great fruit. Id Against this benefit, which the Court assumed to be legitimate, the
Court balanced the $200,000 capital investment that would have been needed to build a new
packaging plant in Arizona. Id The Court found that the burden outweighed the rather slight local
benefit, noting that "the Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business
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The Court has also developed a major exception to the negative
Commerce Clause, which has become known as the market participant
doctrine. 42 In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., a Virginia-based scrap
processor challenged a Maryland statute which effectively precluded out-ofstate processors from participating in a state-funded hulk bounty program.4 3
Upon reviewing past precedent, the Court decided that this case was unique
in that the state was not trying to regulate the flow of hulks but had instead
entered the market as a participant.4 The Court held that because the
Commerce Clause was designed to prevent states from erecting trade
barriers and not from entering the market as a buyer or seller of goods, the
Maryland statute did not violate the negative Commerce Clause.45
operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere."
Id. Justice Stewart intimated that had the state interest been more substantial it might have
outweighed the burden, and thus the statute would have been upheld. Id. at 146.
42. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
43. Id. at 799-802. The program was an attempt by the state of Maryland to reduce the amount
of unsightly abandoned cars in the state. Id. at 796. As part of the program, Maryland offered a
bounty to both wreckers and processors, in hopes that the monetary incentive would encourage them
to dispose of more vehicles. Id. at 797. Proof of title was generally needed in order to receive the
bounty from the state. Id. The state created a new category for cars older than eight years old which
were inoperable and called them "hulks." Id. at 798. In order to speed the legal process, the state
decided not to require proof of title for hulks. Id. at 798-99. However, beginning in 1974,
Maryland amended the statute and began to require title documentation once again. Id. at 800. The
issue was that while in-state processors only needed a simple indemnity agreement, out-of-state
processors were required to submit real proof of title, such as a certificate of title or a bill of sale. Id.
800-01. The effect of the new statutory scheme was to encourage Maryland processors to
participate in the bounty program while simultaneously discouraging out-of-state processors to
participate due to the enhanced burden of proving title. Id at 802. According to Justice Powell, the
hulks tended to remain within Maryland instead of traveling to processors out-of-state. Id
44. Id. at 805-06.
45. Id. at 809-10. Justice Powell noted that this was the first time that the Court had been asked
to hold that a state, as a market participant, could not restrict trade to its own citizens or businesses.
Id at 808. The Court forcefully stated that "[nlothing in the purposes animating the Commerce
Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and
exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." Id. at 810 (footnote omitted). In response,
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, blasted the Court for "its reinterpretation of the Commerce
Clause and its repudiation of established principles guiding judicial analysis thereunder." Id. at 817
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that:
[Sitate statutes that facially or in practical effect restrict state purchases of items in
interstate commerce to those produced within the State are invalid unless justified by
asserted state interests-other than economic protectionism-in regulating matters of
local concern for which "reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve
legitimate local interests, are [not] available."
Id. at 823 (quoting Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951)). He also questioned
whether, even if the market participant doctrine were accepted as stated by the majority, Maryland's
actions in the instant action would fit the definition of a market participant. Id. at 824. To Justice
Brennan, because the state of Maryland was not purchasing the hulks as the end user and instead was
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Reeves v. Stake helped to further refine the market participant doctrine.46
In Reeves, a ready-mix concrete distributor challenged the State of South
Dakota's policy of selling state-manufactured cement to South Dakota
customers before fulfilling out-of-state orders.47 The Court, in reaffirming
Alexandria Scrap, noted that the key distinction to draw in negative
Commerce Clause cases is whether the state is acting as a market participant
or as a market regulator.48 In Reeves, the Court held that, as a seller of
cement, South Dakota fit the definition of a market participant even better
than Maryland did in Alexandria Scrap, and therefore the state policy did not
violate the negative Commerce Clause.49
In addition to general negative Commerce Clause principles, the Court
has, on numerous occasions, considered cases in which tax credits or
subsidies allegedly violated the negative Commerce Clause.50 Of interest is

merely handing out bounties as one link in a long chain of transactions, the state should not qualify
for protection under the exception to the negative Commerce Clause. Id
46. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
47. Id. at 432-33. South Dakota built its own cement manufacturing plant in 1919. Id. at 430.
In 1958, Reeves, Inc., a Wyoming company, began an amicable relationship with the South Dakota
cement plant, and bought cement from the state for a period of two decades. Id. at 432. However,
beginning in 1978, the plant no longer had enough cement to serve all customers because of the
combination of a slowdown at the plant and a spike in demand for cement nationally. Id. at 432.
Thereafter, South Dakota sold to South Dakota residents first and then to all others on a first come,
first served basis. Id at 432-33. As a result, Reeves was not able to purchase cement from the plant
and had to cut production by seventy-six percent. Id. at 433.
48. Id. at 436 ("The basic distinction drawn in Alexandria Scrap between States as market
participants and States as market regulators makes good sense and sound law."). The Court also
sounded a cautionary note with regard to the proper role of its duties, preferring to allow Congress to
take charge. Id. at 439. In discussing the balancing of state prerogatives against the need for judicial
enforcement of the Commerce Clause, Justice Blackmun noted:
Finally, as this case illustrates, the competing considerations in cases involving state
proprietary action often will be subtle, complex, politically charged, and difficult to
assess under traditional Commerce Clause analysis. Given these factors, Alexandria
Scrap wisely recognizes that, as a rule, the adjustment of interests in this context is a task
better suited for Congress than this Court.
Id
49. Id. at 440. The Court also distinguished the case from situations in which a state
impermissibly hoards natural resources, reasoning that cement is not a natural resource but rather the
end product of a manufacturing process. Id. at 443-44.
50. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 588 (1997)
(holding that a Maine statute which provided a greater tax exemption for charitable institutions that
operated principally for the benefit of Maine residents and a more limited exemption for charitable
institutions that conducted most of their business with out-of-state residents was a violation of the
negative Commerce Clause); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 325, 327 (1996) (holding that
a North Carolina statute which "levied an 'intangibles tax' on a fraction of the value of corporate
stock owned by [] residents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's
income tax" violated the negative Commerce Clause); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 278 (1988) (holding that an Ohio statute which provided a tax credit only to Ohio producers or,
alternatively, to producers from states which provided Ohio producers a reciprocal tax credit violated
the negative Commerce Clause); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984) (holding
that a Hawaii statute which taxed liquor sold at wholesale, but exempted certain locally produced
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New Energy v. Limbach, a 1988 case in which an out-of-state ethanol

producer challenged an Ohio statute that provided a tax credit against the
Ohio fuel sales tax for ethanol produced either in Ohio or in a state which
granted a reciprocal tax credit to Ohio producers.5 ' The State claimed that
the provision which allowed for reciprocity rendered the law facially neutral,
but the Court found this argument unavailing.5 2 In finding that the Ohio
statute violated the negative Commerce Clause, Justice Scalia stated that
while direct subsidization of an in-state industry usually will not implicate
the negative Commerce Clause, a discriminatory tax against an out-of-state
business usually will.s 3

beverages, violated the negative Commerce Clause); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S.
388, 407 (1984) (holding that a New York statute that gave corporations a tax credit only when their
subsidiaries exported goods from New York violated the negative Commerce Clause); Boston Stock
Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 337 (1977) (holding that a New York statute that
imposed a greater tax liability on sales of securities executed out-of-state than those executed in-state
violated the negative Commerce Clause because "in the process of competition no State may
discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or the business operations performed in any other
State"). In all of these tax cases, the Court considered situations in which a state provided a private
enterprise with a discriminatory advantage against out-of-state interests. For an introduction to the
Court's modem analysis regarding the public-private distinction in negative Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, see infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
51. New Energy, 486 U.S. at 271. Ethanol, usually made from corn in the United States, is
mixed with gasoline to make fuel for motor vehicles. Id Considered advantageous because it
increases com demand, is reputed to be good for the environment and may help the United States
achieve some measure of energy independence, ethanol is more expensive than regular gasoline to
produce, and therefore many states provide a tax credit for ethanol. Id. The Ohio statute at issue
stated that "[t]he qualified fuel otherwise eligible for the qualified fuel credit shall not contain
ethanol produced outside Ohio unless the tax commissioner determines that the fuel claimed to be
eligible for credit contains ethanol produced in a state that also grants an exemption." Id. at 272 n. I
(quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5735.145(B) (West 2006)).
52. Id. at 274. Ohio argued that the provision for reciprocity would actually induce other states
to enact similar tax credits, and thus the market for ethanol would expand to the benefit of all
Americans. Id. Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that "the promise to remove
that [economic disadvantage] if reciprocity is accepted no more justifies disparity of treatment than it
would justify categorical exclusion." Id at 275. Further, the fact that the disparity in tax apparently
affected only one out-of-state producer did not matter as "neither a widespread advantage to in-state
interests nor a widespread disadvantage to out-of-state competitors [need] be shown." Id at 276.
53. Id at 278. Ironically, the Indiana company which challenged Ohio's taxing statute benefited
from a subsidy that Indiana gave to ethanol producers. Id. However, as Justice Scalia noted, "[t]he
Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to give its residents an advantage in the
marketplace, but only action of that description in connection with the State's regulationof interstate
commerce." Id. For negative Commerce Clause purposes, tax exemptions and subsidies have long
been treated differently, with subsidies to in-state industry generally allowed. See Attaway, supra
note 1, at 745 ("The justification for the distinction may be that, because subsidies must be made
annually by legislative appropriation-as opposed to tax exemptions, which are effective until
repealed-subsidies have a 'heightened "political visibility."' (quoting Dan T. Coenen, Untangling
the Market-ParticipantExemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395, 481
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In another modem tax case, the Court considered a Maine property tax
provision which provided a greater tax break for charitable institutions that
operated primarily for the benefit of Maine residents as opposed to those that
operated primarily for the benefit of out-of-state residents.54 The case
marked the first time the Court considered "the disparate real estate tax
treatment of a nonprofit service provider based on the residence of the
consumers that it serves."" While the Court concluded that the statute was
facially discriminatory, the more interesting question was whether a tax
exemption for a charitable institution, as opposed to a for-profit business,
should result in a different outcome." Justice Stevens concluded that "[f]or
purposes of Commerce Clause analysis, any categorical distinction between
the activities of profit-making enterprises and not-for-profit entities
is ... wholly illusory," and therefore the tax exemption violated the negative
Commerce Clause.s
(1989))).
54. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 568. The statute gave charitable institutions incorporated in
the state a general exemption from paying real estate and personal property taxes. Id. However, if
the charitable institution was run for the benefit of out-of-state residents, the tax benefit was much
more limited. Id. The Petitioner, a nonprofit camp at which only five percent of the campers were
from Maine, challenged the statute on the grounds that it violated the negative Commerce Clause.
Id. at 567.
55. Id. at 572. The Court noted that "[tihere is no question that were this statute targeted at
profit-making entities, it would violate the dormant Commerce Clause." Id. at 575.
56. Id. at 579. The Court spent some time explaining that the fact that the in-state charitable
institution, rather than the out-of-state camper, felt the brunt of the discriminatory taxation scheme
was irrelevant. Id. at 580. At least in part, the campers would be responsible for the lack of a tax
exemption, perhaps through increased costs. Id. Further, the Court likened the Maine camps to the
natural resources of any state. Id. at 576-77 ("We have 'consistently ... held that the Commerce
Clause . . .precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of access,
over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within its borders or to the products derived
therefrom."' (quoting New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982))).
57. Id. at 583. The Court quickly stated that the fact that an entity is not-for-profit should not
change the negative Commerce Clause analysis. Id. at 584; see NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S.
672, 681 n.11 (1980) ("Congress appears to have agreed that nonprofit institutions 'affect
commerce' under modem economic conditions."). The Town made the argument that the tax break
was effectively a government subsidy and that the government was choosing to purchase services
from those camps which served Maine residents. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 588-89. Justice
Scalia, writing for the dissent, agreed with this view, stating that the tax exemption was merely a
way for the state to save money by encouraging camps to provide services that Maine might
ordinarily provide. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he provision at issue here is a narrow tax
exemption, designed merely to compensate or subsidize those organizations that contribute to the
public fise by dispensing public benefits the State might otherwise provide."). As Justice Scalia
noted, the statute did not provide tax exemptions to non-profit institutions that served Maine
residents, but rather to non-profit charitable institutions that provided a substantial public benefit.
Id at 599.
58. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 586 (majority opinion). Justice Scalia continued to promote
judicial restraint. Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In a preview of Justice Souter's dissent in
Carbone and of the Court's opinion ten years later in United Haulers, Justice Scalia advanced the
notion that the Commerce Clause should not be used 'to cut the States off from legislating on all
subjects relating to the health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly
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Finally, central to an understanding of Davis is the Court's recent
decision in United Haulers where the importance of a public-private
distinction in negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence gained more
traction.5 9 Solid waste management companies sued a government-created
waste authority to enjoin a "flow control" ordinance that required that all
solid waste be delivered to a public authority's processing center.o The
Court stated that this case was categorically different from C & A Carbone,
Inc. v. Clarkstown,6' a recent decision that overturned a similar "flow
control" ordinance, because the benefited party here was a public entity,
while in Carbone the benefited party was a private entity.62 In his dissent to

affect the commerce of the country."' Id. (quoting Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S.
440,443-44 (1960)).
59. See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786
(2007).
60. Id. at 1791. During the 1980's, New York's Oneida and Herkimer counties experienced a
"solid waste crisis" and requested that the state create a central solid waste management authority to
run the counties' waste programs. Id. The state created a public benefit corporation ("Authority")
which in turn created facilities for the disposal and processing of waste materials. Id. In order to
cover the cost of the operations, the Authority decided to make the use of its facilities by all private
haulers mandatory by enacting a so-called "flow control" ordinance. Id. The Authority charged a
higher fee for its services than a company might get on the private market, in part because the
Authority "offered" enhanced recycling services. Id. United Haulers Association, Inc. sued the
Authority and claimed that the flow control ordinance was a violation of the negative Commerce
Clause. Id. at 1792. The haulers would have saved a significant amount in fees if they had been
allowed to use an out-of-state facility. Id.
61. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
62. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1790. In C & A Carbone,Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. at 386,
the Court considered a flow control ordinance which dictated that all solid waste had to be deposited
in a private facility. The arrangement was advantageous for the city of Clarkstown because the
private company agreed to sell its new waste facility to the city after a set number of years for one
dollar if the city agreed to create the ordinance mandating that all solid waste be deposited at the
facility. Id. at 387. The Court in Carbone struck down the mandate because it facially discriminated
against interstate commerce. Id. at 392. There was disagreement in Carbone as to whether or not
the facility was actually a private facility. Id. at 419 (Souter, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts,
writing for the Court in United Haulers, stated that "[t]he Carbone dissent offered a number of
reasons why public entities should be treated differently from private ones under the dormant
Commerce Clause. It is hard to suppose that the Carbone majority definitively rejected these
arguments without explaining why." United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1794 (citation omitted). Chief
Justice Roberts further opined that "Carbone cannot be regarded as having decided the publicprivate question," because, "[i]f the Court were extending this line of local processing cases to cover
discrimination in favor of local government, one would expect it to have said so." Id. at 1794-95.
In holding that public entities are to be treated differently than private entities for the purpose of a
negative Commerce Clause discrimination analysis, Chief Justice Roberts noted the importance of
government being able to "protect[] the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens," thereby making
government entirely different from private enterprise. Id. at 1795. The Chief Justice went on to
argue in favor of federalism, stating that "[t]he dormant Commerce Clause is not a roving license for
federal courts to decide what activities are appropriate for state and local government to undertake,
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Carbone, Justice Souter laid the groundwork for United Haulers by offering
a number of reasons why Commerce Clause jurisprudence with regard to
laws benefiting public facilities should be treated differently from laws
benefiting private facilities. 63 The Court in United Haulers largely adopted
Justice Souter's reasoning and held that, because the "flow control"
ordinance benefited a government entity rather than a private business, there
was no violation of the negative Commerce Clause.64
III. FACTS

The Commonwealth of Kentucky exempts income derived from its own
state-issued bonds from state income tax collection while still taxing income
derived from bonds originating in other states.65 George and Catherine
and what activities must be the province of private market competition." Id. at 1796. Further, the
Court went on to note that waste disposal is a traditional government function, making the case
against intervention even stronger, and that if the people of the state did not like the laws, they could
change their elected representatives. Id. at 1796-97.
63. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 419-22 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun in dissent, suggested that "favoring state-sponsored facilities differs
from discriminating among private economic actors, and is much less likely to be protectionist." Id.
at 421. He noted that the government is very different from the private market and has the
responsibility to engage in activity for the public good; therefore, a government's actions should not
be equated with economic protectionism. Id. The dissent suggested that the town of Clarkstown had
an obligation to build a new waste facility, and that the passage of the flow control ordinance was
the most effective means to fulfill the need. Id. at 420. Finally, Justice Souter reasoned that "a law
that favors that single [municipal] facility over all others is a law that favors the public sector over
all private-sector processors" and should therefore pass negative Commerce Clause scrutiny. Id. at
422.
64. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1797. Foreshadowing the dissent in Davis, Justice Alito wrote
a strong dissent. Id. at 1803 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito argued that the facts in United
Haulers were essentially indistinguishable from the facts in Carbone, and that "[t]he public-private
distinction drawn by the Court is both illusory and without precedent." Id. at 1804. In fact, Justice
Alito stated that just the opposite is true, in that "[tihis Court long ago recognized that the Commerce
Clause can be violated by a law that discriminates in favor of a state-owned monopoly." Id. at 1806.
For support, Justice Alito drew on a case over 100 years old, Scott v. Donald, in which the Court
invalidated a South Carolina statute that gave a state agency the exclusive right to sell alcoholic
beverages. Id. (citing Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897)). Justice Alito conceded that some states
now do have the right to run a state-owned liquor monopoly, but that the only reason is the passage
of the Twenty-First Amendment. Id. For Justice Alito, because there was no similar federal
Amendment or law authorizing states to discriminate against out-of-state waste facility providers, a
law which allowed such discrimination had to be deemed a violation of the negative Commerce
Clause. Id.
65. Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1805 (2008). The Kentucky law at issue,
Kentucky Revenue Statute § 141.020, creates a situation in which "[i]nterest on bonds issued by
Kentucky and its political subdivisions is thus entirely exempt, whereas interest on municipal bonds
of other States and their subdivisions is taxable." Id. (footnote omitted). Interestingly, the United
States Tax Code provides for the exclusion of all gains derived from state or municipal bonds when
calculating gross income, effectively making the income entirely tax free, regardless of the state of
origin, at the national level. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006). Specifically, the Code states that "gross
income does not include interest on any State or local bond." Id. For more on why a state finds such
a differential taxation scheme preferable, see supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
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Davis are Kentucky residents who owned out-of-state municipal bonds. 6
Pursuant to Kentucky revenue statutes, the interest income from these outof-state bonds was included in the Davises' gross income for Kentucky state
tax purposes and, consequently, they were taxed on their gains.
The Davises originally filed a class action complaint against Kentucky's
tax collectors, claiming that the differential taxation scheme violated both
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.6 8 After
failing on both theories,69 the Davises appealed to the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky. 70 The Court of Appeals of Kentucky reversed the lower court,
finding that the differential taxation scheme violated the negative Commerce
Clause because it was facially discriminatory and did not fall under an
exception to the United States Supreme Court's negative Commerce Clause
After the Supreme Court of Kentucky declined an
jurisprudence.7 t
66. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1807.
67. Id
68. Davis v. Dep't of Revenue of the Fin, and Admin. Cabinet, 197 S.W.3d 557, 560 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
69. Id. at 560-61. In finding the provision constitutional, the state trial court apparently relied on
the market participant exception to the negative Commerce Clause. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1807;
see also supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text. Kentucky's Jefferson Circuit Court also found
that the Davises lacked standing to challenge the statute on behalf of others who had not yet joined
the class, and granted summary judgment. Davis, 197 S.W.3d at 560-61. However, as the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky noted, the trial court did find that the Davises had standing to contest their own
alleged injury because they had already paid income tax on the bonds. Id. at 565. The confusion
over standing likely resulted from the fact that the Department of Revenue of Kentucky brought the
motion for summary judgment before the Davises had the opportunity to seek certification of the
class. Id. at 560.
70. Davis, 197 S.W.3d at 561.
71. Id at 564. Judge Minton, writing for a three-member panel for the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, began his analysis by stating "[c]learly, Kentucky's bond taxation system is facially
unconstitutional as it obviously affords more favorable taxation treatment to in-state bonds than it
does to extraterritorially issued bonds." Id. at 562. In contrast, the state tried to rely on Shaper v.
Tracy, a 1994 case from the Court of Appeals of Ohio, where the Ohio court found a nearly identical
differential taxation scheme to be constitutionally permissible, in part because "[t]he instant action
d[id] not involve a taxation scheme whereby the citizenry of Ohio are provided with a competitive
advantage over the citizenry of other states. Rather, the taxation scheme in the instant action
benefit[ed] the state of Ohio itself." Shaper v. Tracy, 647 N.E.2d 550, 553-54 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that "[g]iven the lack of any precedent to apply the Commerce Clause to this type of
taxation scheme, we are unable to find [the statute] unconstitutional as violative of the Commerce
Clause"). After admitting that Shaper was the only case on all fours with the instant action, Judge
Minton resoundingly dismissed the state of Kentucky's reliance on Shaper by concluding that "that
[Ohio] court failed fully to analyze the issue." Davis, 197 S.W.3d at 563. Having already found that
the statute discriminated against interstate commerce, Judge Minton held that the taxation scheme
could not be saved by the market participant doctrine because the state was not acting as a market
participant when it made taxing decisions. Id. at 564. Justice Kennedy echoed this sentiment in his
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opportunity to review the case, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, partly "because the result reached [in the Kentucky state court]
casts constitutional doubt on a tax regime adopted by a majority of the
States." 72
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

A. Justice Souter's Majority Opinion

Justice Souter began the majority opinion 73 by outlining Kentucky's
differential taxation scheme 74 and discussing the importance of the tax-free
bonds to the states as a source of revenue. In addition, Justice Souter noted
dissent in Davis when he argued that Kentucky could not be a market participant because "[t]he
challenged state activity is differential taxation, not bond issuance." Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1825
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); see infra notes 142-147 and accompanying text.
72. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808.
73. Justice Souter, writing for the Court, was joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer in full, by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg as to all parts except Part III-B (explaining the
application of the market participant doctrine), and by Justice Scalia as to all parts except for Parts
III-B and IV (discussing the application of Pike balancing). Id at 1804.
74. Id. at 1804-05. Under Kentucky law, residents are taxed based upon their total net income.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.020(1) (West 2006); Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1804. The state adopted the
Internal Revenue Service's definition of "gross income" as its own. Id; see I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006)
("[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived."). Therefore, because the
Internal Revenue Code does not include interest income derived from state or local bonds, the state
of Kentucky generally does not either. I.R.C. § 103(a) ("[G]ross income does not include interest on
any State or local bond."); Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1804-05. However, Kentucky added to its own
definition of gross income by including "'interest income derived from obligations of sister states
and political subdivisions thereof,"' in the adjusted gross income of Kentucky state taxpayers. Id. at
1805 (quoting § 141.010(10)(c)). The net effect is that while interest income earned on bonds issued
by Kentucky and its political subdivisions remains excluded from Kentucky state income tax,
interest income on bonds issued by all other states and their political subdivisions is included in
Kentucky residents' gross income and is therefore taxable at the state level. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at
1805.
75. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1806. Justice Souter noted that during just a six year period, from 1996
to 2002, "Kentucky and its subdivisions issued $7.7 billion in long-term bonds to pay for spending
on transportation, public safety, education, utilities, and environmental protection, among other
things." Id. Of the $7.7 billion of bonds issued in Kentucky, nearly $2 billion went toward helping
the state meet its education expenses. See Cynthia Belmonte, IRS, Tax Exempt Bonds, 1996-2002,
Summer 2005 Statistics of Income Bulletin 151, 169, available at http://irs.gov/pub/irssoi/02govbnd.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2009). Nationwide during this same period, a total of $2.1
trillion in tax-exempt bonds was issued by the States and their subdivisions. Id. at 151.
Interestingly, of this $2.1 trillion, $548 billion in bonds was issued as private activity bonds. Id.
Unlike regular government bonds, private activity bonds are utilized by a private entity to help
finance projects which generally have some sort of public use. Id. at 152 ("The major types of
exempt facility bonds are bonds issued for airports; docks and wharves; sewage facilities; solid
waste disposal facilities; qualified residential rental projects; and facilities for the local furnishing of
electricity or gas."). Other organizations that benefit from private activity bonds include IRC §
501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations such as "hospitals, universities, and organizations that provide
low-income housing or assisted living facilities." Id. One of the amici for the Davises argued that
even if the Court found the issuance of bonds for governmental purposes to be valid, the Court
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that the historical practice of states issuing untaxed municipal bonds had
gone on since 1919.6 After reciting the relevant facts of the case 77 and the

should still strike down the preferential treatment for in-state private activity bonds. See Brief for
Alan D. Viard et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 26, Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v.
Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008) (No. 06-666), 2007 WL 2808465 (arguing that "[w]ith private-activity
bonds, however, private parties are the actual borrowers, not state or local governments. The United
Haulers exception should not apply in any event to this segment of the municipal bond market.").
Justice Souter declined to discuss this argument in detail, noting that the Davises themselves had not
bothered to advance the argument and that it had not been considered by the court below. Davis,
128 S. Ct. at 1805 n.2. Instead of considering it as part of Davis, the majority preferred to "set this
argument aside and leave for another day any claim that differential treatment of interest on privateactivity bonds should be evaluated differently from the treatment of municipal bond interest
generally." Id. During oral arguments Justice Alito raised the difference between bonds which
benefit the government generally and bonds which benefit a private entity. See Transcript of Oral
Argument of C. Christopher Trower on Behalf of Petitioners at 3-5, Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v.
Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008) (No. 06-666), 2007 WL 3248725. As part of this discussion, Justice
Souter asked, "Doesn't that raise, in effect, sort of a distinction between Carbone and United
Haulers? Or at least one way of understanding the distinction between those two cases? In Carbone
the facility, in fact, was not the facility of the government." Id. at 4-5. Justice Souter was referring
to the fact that in Carbone, a majority of the Court struck down a flow control ordinance which
benefited a private waste facility, even though the city would be benefited tangentially from the
regulation. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994); see supra notes 6263 and accompanying text. The dissent in Davis also declined to discuss private activity bonds,
perhaps because the majority refused to consider them. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1822-30. However, if
the Court were to consider the preferential tax treatment of private activity bonds in the future, it
would be unlikely to find such a differential taxation scheme constitutional given the distinction the
Court previously drew between Carbone and United Haulers. In order to find private activity bonds
constitutional, the Court would either have to dismiss precedent in Carbone or find a way to carve
out a distinction for private activity bonds by arguing that their issuance directly benefits states and
their subsidiaries. Commentators have already suggested that the Court's inability to address private
activity bonds in Davis will lead to continuing uncertainty in the municipal bond market. Dormant
Commerce Clause, supra note I1, at 277 ("[T]he Davis ruling is only a hollow victory for [the
municipal bond market] because it does not rule on the tax treatment of an important form of
municipal debt issuance-private activity bonds. Until the Court is presented with a case that
enables it to rule on the tax treatment of private activity bonds, uncertainty on this issue will
continue to affect the municipal bond market."). For a more in-depth discussion of the possibility
that private activity bonds will eventually be found to violate the negative Commerce Clause, see
infra notes 174-177 and accompanying text.
76. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1806. Differential bond taxation schemes have been common since the
early part of the twentieth century. Id. In 1919, New York became the first state to create a
favorable tax scheme for its own bonds, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky followed suit in 1936.
Id. The fact that states soon followed New York in creating discriminatory taxation schemes is
exactly the kind of evidence that Justice Kennedy would use in arguing for the application of the
negative Commerce Clause. Indeed, he underscored this very point in his dissent when he noted that
the fact "[t]hat 41 States have local protectionist laws similar to this one proves the necessity of
allowing settled principles against discrimination to operate in an important national market" and
went on to chastise the Court for being "proud" in pointing out that New York was the first state to
implement the taxation plan. Id at 1829 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
77. For more on the facts, see supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
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procedural history of the case in the lower courts, 8 Justice Souter noted that
the Court granted certiorari to resolve an important issue of constitutional
law.79
Justice Souter next progressed through a standard negative Commerce
Clause rule statement.s0 However, in laying out the Court's negative
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Justice Souter emphasized the federalist
principles which seemingly contradict the negative Commerce Clause,
something that not even Chief Justice Roberts did in United Haulers.8 '
78. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
79. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808.
80. Id. Justice Souter noted that the negative Commerce Clause was derived out of Congress's
Commerce Clause powers as a way to protect against economic protectionism and ensure that states
did not become Balkanized. Id.; see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. If a law is viewed
as discriminatory for economic protectionist reasons, it will usually be automatically invalidated.
Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808. However, the law can be saved "if it 'advances a legitimate local purpose
that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives."' Id (quoting Or.
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994)). If there is no
discrimination for economic protectionist reasons, the Court applies Pike balancing and attempts to
discern whether the burden on interstate commerce outweighs the benefits to the state. Id. Finally,
in some cases, a state's law will be saved if the state is found to be an active market participant
rather than a market regulator. Id. at 1809.
81. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808. In United Haulers, Chief Justice Roberts provided a much more
streamlined rule statement and made no mention of federalist principles. United Haulers Ass'n v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1792-93 (2007). Conversely, in
Davis, Justice Souter argued that "the Framers' distrust of economic Balkanization was limited by
their federalism favoring a degree of local autonomy." Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808 (citing THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 7, 11 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 42, 51 (James Madison) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan eds., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2001) (1787)). The discussion of the importance of both
unity in commerce and of federalism by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison provides important
insight in understanding how the founders viewed the Constitution. Alexander Hamilton wrote
about the problems unfettered commerce between the states might cause when he noted:
The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention. The states
less favourably circumstanced, would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of
local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbours. Each
state, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial polity peculiar to
itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget
discontent.
THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 28-29 (Alexander Hamilton). In another paper, Hamilton argued that the
colonies must remain united commercially so as to prevent European domination of the young
country. THE FEDERALIST NO. I1, at 49-55 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton noted that "[b]y
prohibitory regulations, extending at the same time throughout the states, we may oblige foreign
countries to bid against each other, for the privileges of our markets." Id. at 50. Indeed, Hamilton
opined that if the country did not remain united in commerce, the power of the country would be
greatly diminished and the United States would devolve into an economy of "passive commerce."
Id. at 52 (arguing that if commerce was not regulated in the United States, "[t]hat unequalled spirit
of enterprise, which signalizes the genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which is in
itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be stifled and lost; and poverty and disgrace
would overspread a country, which, with wisdom, might make herself the admiration and envy of the
world."). James Madison took up the cause to argue for Congress' ability to regulate interstate
commerce in his own papers. THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison). Madison wrote that one
of the main defects in the old confederacy was that there was no central authority capable of
regulating commerce among the separate states, and that if this practice were to continue, "it would
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Subsequently, Justice Souter summarized United Haulers82 and began
his analysis with the simple, yet bold, statement that "[i]t follows a fortiori
from United Haulers that Kentucky must prevail."13 The rationale was
straightforward in that, because the state of Kentucky was fulfilling the
traditional government function of raising revenue through the issuance of
bonds, the manner in which it chose to do so could not be circumscribed by
the negative Commerce Clause so long as all private entities were treated the
same.8 4 Justice Souter continued to develop the public-private distinction
nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public
tranquillity." Id. at 218-19. However, against this backdrop in which Hamilton and Madison
explained why it was important that the states not be allowed to discriminate against one another in
commerce, Madison also argued that federalism was the answer to many of the problems of the old
confederacy. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). Madison stated that the challenge of
creating a government was that "[one] must first enable the government to control the governed; and
in the next place oblige it to control itself." Id. at 269. The solution to the problem of an allpowerful central government was to divide power between multiple governments and then divide the
power within each government into several smaller parts. Id. at 270 ("In the compound republic of
America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments,
and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments."). On the
whole, Hamilton and Madison certainly argue for the importance of a unified national system of
commerce, yet they also speak to the importance of a federal system in which the powers of
government remain divided and no one government hoards all of the power. The dissenters in Davis
seem to agree wholeheartedly with the admonitions in The FederalistNos. 7, 11 and 42, but do not
speak much to the importance that the majority implicitly lends to James Madison's argument in The
Federalist No. 51 with respect to federalism. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1822 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Justice Kennedy noted that "[f]ree trade in the United States, unobstructed by state and
local barriers, was indispensable if we were to unite to ensure the liberty and progress of the whole
Nation and its people." Id. Justice Kennedy went on to note that historically the nation has
benefited as result of general unity in commerce. Id.
82. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1809 (majority opinion). The points which Justice Souter chose to
emphasize effectively foreshadow his analysis. He noted that, as the Court found in United Haulers,
states have a duty to provide goods and services for their citizens and there are good reasons to treat
laws which favor states and municipalities differently than laws which favor private enterprise. See
id He further stressed that in UnitedHaulers, the supposed harm that developed from the statutemore expensive trash removal-was a burden which would be borne by the very people (in-state
residents) who elected the representatives that enacted the laws in the first place. Id. He closed by
again noting the federalist underpinnings which guided the Court's decision in UnitedHaulers. Id.
at 1809-10 ("Being concerned that a 'contrary approach . .. would lead to unprecedented and
unbounded interference by the courts with state and local government,' . . . we held that the
ordinance did 'not discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce
Clause."' (quoting UnitedHaulers,127 S. Ct. at 1795-96) (citation omitted)).
83. Id. at 1810. Justice Souter argued that United Haulers stands for the proposition that the
negative Commerce Clause analysis should not be applied to traditional government functions. Id.
He noted that the issuance of bonds to pay for the needs of the public "is a quintessentially public
function" and seemed to intimate that the government function of raising revenue to pay for projects
is an even more traditional government function than providing for waste removal. Id at 1810-11.
84. Id. Justice Kennedy strongly attacked the majority's analysis on this point. Id. at 1824
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). He noted that Justice Souter merely reformulated the police power when
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by referencing Bonaparte v. Tax Court, an 1882 case in which the Supreme
Court held that when state-issued bonds travel out of their state of origin,
they lose their public character and become part of the private market.85 The
majority then returned to United Haulers, arguing that, like New York's
statute in United Haulers, the Kentucky tax scheme benefited only the
public entity of the state and treated all private entities, both in-state and out,
exactly the same.
Having already decided that "[t]his type of law does 'not "discriminate
against interstate commerce" for purposes of the [negative] Commerce
Clause,'"8 Justice Souter next applied the market participant doctrine in Part

he referred to a state's traditional government functions, which did not immunize it from
constitutional limitations. Id. ("That a law has the police power label-as all laws do-does not
exempt it from Commerce Clause analysis."). According to Justice Kennedy, if the majority
analysis were to be adopted, any government function could be restated as a police power, and state
laws regarding that government function would therefore receive immunity from negative
Commerce Clause scrutiny. Id. Justice Souter responded by suggesting that the dissenters did not
entirely understand his message in United Haulers. Id. at 1810 n.9 (majority opinion) ("The point of
asking whether the challenged governmental preference operated to support a traditional public
function was not to draw fine distinctions among governmental functions, but to find out whether the
preference was for the benefit of a government fulfilling governmental obligations or for the benefit
of private interests, favored because they were local.").
85. Id. at 1811 (citing Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 595 (1882)). In Bonaparte, the
Court considered the complaint of Baltimore resident Mrs. Elizabeth Patterson, who was forced to
pay Maryland tax on the out-of-state bonds she owned. Bonaparte, 104 U.S. at 592. Mrs. Patterson
owned securities issued by New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and the City of Philadelphia. Id All of
the public debt she owned was exempted from taxation in each security's respective home state. Id.
However, the State of Maryland refused to acknowledge the tax exemptions and taxed her gains. Id.
Chief Justice Waite, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that "[w]e know of no provision of
the Constitution of the United States which prohibits such taxation," and "[t]he only agreement as to
taxation was that the debt should not be taxed by the State which created it." Id. at 594. More
importantly, at least for Justice Souter's purposes in Davis, Chief Justice Waite next spoke to the
character of the bonds themselves. He noted that once the debt moves out of the state of origin,
"[t]he debtor State is in no respect his sovereign, neither has it any of the attributes of sovereignty as
to the debt it owes." Id. at 595. Finally, the Chief Justice seemed to condone the very sort of
differential taxation at issue in this case when he wrote that while a state can exclude its own debts
from taxation within its own borders, it does not have the ability to prevent taxation of its debt
outside its border. Id. at 595 ("It is true, if a State could protect its securities from taxation
everywhere, it might succeed in borrowing money at reduced interest; but, inasmuch as it cannot
secure such exemption outside of its own jurisdiction, it is compelled to go into the market as a
borrower, subject to the same disabilities in this particular as individuals." (emphasis added)).
86. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811. The dissent refused to acknowledge the public-private distinction
and blasted the Court by saying that throughout history, with the exception of United Haulers, "the
Court had ceased to view the concept as saying anything instructive." Id. at 1824 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter seemingly mocked the dissent's resistance to submit to the Court's
holding in United Haulers by simply stating that "the dissenters thus carry on the battle that was
fought in United Haulers." Id. at 1810 n.9 (majority opinion) ("One of the two fundamental points
of difference between the Court and the dissenters is their rejection of the constitutional distinction
between public and private preference .... ).
87. Id. at 1811 (quoting United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1797). The majority held that there was no
discrimination in this case simply "because [the state], as a public entity, does not have to treat itself
as being 'substantially similar' to the other bond issuers in the market." Id.
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III-B of his opinion." He started by rejecting the Davises' argument that the
ultimate issue in this case was the differential taxation of the bonds; the real
concern, according to Justice Souter, was that the state issued the bonds in
the first place. Justice Souter found that the tax could not be bifurcated
from the issuance of the bonds because "there is no ignoring the fact that
imposing the differential tax scheme makes sense only because Kentucky is

88. Id. A majority of the Court did not join Justice Souter's discussion of the market participant
doctrine. Id. at 1802. Chief Justice Roberts stated that, in his view, "the case is readily resolved by
last Term's decision in United Haulers," and therefore there was no need to consider the market
participation doctrine. Id. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part). Likewise, Justice Scalia chose
not to join Justice Souter's market participation analysis because "Part III-A adequately resolves the
issue." Id. at 1821 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Justice Thomas, flatly rejecting the existence of
the negative Commerce Clause as a sound part of the Court's jurisprudence, also declined to join
Justice Souter in applying the market participation doctrine. Id. at 1821-22 (Thomas, J., concurring
in judgment). Justice Kennedy did not let this lack of unity go unnoticed and he seemed gleeful that
only a single part of Justice Souter's opinion actually garnered a majority of the Court. Id at 1827
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Unfortunately for Justice Kennedy, it was the most important part-the
application of the civic responsibility exception-in which Justice Souter secured a majority.
89. Id at 1811-12 (majority opinion). Again, the dissent continued to voice its disagreement
with Justice Souter's analysis, warning that the true issue in the case was Kentucky's taxation of the
bonds, rather than the issuance of them. Id. at 1825 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The challenged state
activity is differential taxation, not bond issuance. The state tax provision at issue could be repealed
tomorrow without altering or impairing a single obligation in the bonds."). The majority saw the
issue as one of public finance in which bond issuance and taxation were two integral parts of a
singular whole. Id. The distinction is key to the outcome of the case, because Justice Souter seemed
to admit that, were the case simply about Kentucky using its taxing authority, negative Commerce
Clause scrutiny would probably be appropriate. Id. at 1812. (plurality opinion). The Court has
previously invalidated a number of taxing schemes because of discrimination against interstate
commerce. See supra note 50. Justice Souter specifically cited a number of these cases. In one,
Camps Newfound, the Court considered a Maine statute which gave a tax exemption to charitable
organizations, so long as those charitable organizations operated for the benefit of residents of
Maine. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 568 (1997).
Although Justice Souter did not note the difference between Camps Newfound and Davis, the
difference is clear-the tax statute in Camps Newfound existed in order to benefit private
organizations, whereas the tax statute in Davis existed in order to benefit public entities in the form
of the state or municipalities. The distinction holds in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325
(1996). In that case, the Court considered a North Carolina statute which set the tax rate on
corporate stock at an inverse proportion to the amount of business a company did in North Carolina.
Fulton, 516 U.S. at 327-28. North Carolina did not act for its own good, but merely penalized both
private companies who conducted relatively little business in the state and the private citizens who
owned those companies' securities. Id. Finally, in Baccus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, the Court
considered and struck down a Hawaii statute which imposed a twenty percent excise tax on liquor
generally, but excepted some liquors which were produced locally. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,
468 U.S. 263, 265 (1984). Again, the beneficiaries of the tax were private producers, not the state
itself. See id. at 269. It is clear that while the Court has consistently ruled that taxes that favor
private entities run afoul of the negative Commerce Clause, the Court has never held that a tax
benefiting a public entity does the same.
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also a bond issuer." 90 To Justice Souter, the fact that Kentucky was a
participant in the very market it regulated meant that the regulation could not
be seen as discriminatory under the traditional negative Commerce Clause
analysis.9' In many prior cases, the Court upheld regulations which would
have violated the negative Commerce Clause had they benefited a private
interest instead of the state or a similar public entity.92 Justice Souter went
on to explain that in order to hold that the Kentucky scheme violated the
negative Commerce Clause, the Court would have to effectively overrule its
past market participant doctrine jurisprudence.93 For Justice Souter, because
90. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1812 (plurality opinion) ("The Commonwealth has entered the market
for debt securities, just as Maryland entered the market for automobile hulks . .. and South Dakota
entered the cement market . . . ." (citation omitted)). This supposition certainly seems logical. If the
state of Kentucky and its subdivisions did not issue bonds, there would be no need for it to create a
differential taxation scheme to make the bonds more attractive on the open market. Therefore,
Justice Kennedy was very much right when he said that, "[i]t is the tax that matters." Id. at 1825
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). However, Justice Kennedy was right that it is the tax that matters only
because Kentucky issues bonds to begin with. Id. Without the bonds, the argument over taxation
becomes irrelevant.
91. Id. at 1812 (plurality opinion). Professor Norman R. Williams, in a recent article on the
importance of a national economic union to the United States, adopts the argument of the dissent.
He suggests that this case is not about what Kentucky is selling; rather, it is about
"Kentucky . .. taxing bonds sold by other states to Kentucky taxpayers." Norman R. Williams, The
Foundations of the American Common Market, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 409, 458 n.187 (2008).
Professor Williams suggests that "Kentucky is not purchasing or selling any item; it has not, for
example, decided to sell its bonds only to Kentucky citizens, a policy that might arguably qualify as
within the exception." Id. This argument is again in line with the dissenters' seemingly ceaseless
contention that taxing "is a quintessential act of regulation, not market participation." Davis, 128 S.
Ct. at 1829 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Both Professor Williams and the dissent in Davis cite to New
Energy for authority that taxation is a regulatory function, not a market activity. Id. at 1829-30;
Williams, supra at 458 n.187. This case, of course, is very different than New Energy. New Energy
dealt with a tax credit which Ohio provided to in-state fuel dealers and those out-of-state fuel dealers
who came from states with reciprocal agreements. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 271-72 (1988); see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. Davis, once again, is
completely antithetical to New Energy because in the former, the tax scheme existed for the purpose
of furthering a public financing scheme, not for the benefit of a privatebusiness entity.
92. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1813-14. Professor Blumstein noted three decades ago that, while the
Court routinely strikes down taxes which burden out-of-state businesses, there may be a difference
in analysis when the government is the beneficiary of a taxing scheme. He wrote that:
Of course, what makes the matter interesting at the outset is that the disparity in tax
treatment of out-of-state tax-exempt securities results from differential treatment when
the ostensible beneficiary is the state itself or a sub-unit of local government. The other
tax cases, in which the Court "has seldom hesitated to strike down statutes discriminatory
on their face," involved tax disadvantages for out-of-state businesses that were competing
with local enterprise. Given Hughes, and to a lesser extent Usery, one must at least stop
to inquire whether this distinction does or should make a difference analytically.
James F. Blumstein, Some Intersections of the Negative Commerce Clause and the New Federalism:
The Case of Discriminatory State Income Tax Treatment of Out-of-State Tax-Exempt Bonds, 31
VAND. L. REv. 473, 565-66 (1978) (quoting Note, Developments in the Law-FederalLimitations
on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARv. L. REV. 953, 962 n.44 (1962)) (footnote
omitted).
93. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1813. (plurality opinion). Justice Souter cited to Alexandria Scrap as an
example of a case which would have to be overruled in order to hold that Kentucky was not a market
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the state acted as a regulator in order to further its involvement in the
market, the differential taxation scheme fit squarely within the market
participant exemption. 94
In Part III-C, Justice Souter, again delivering the opinion of the Court,
discussed the market that the tax exemption affects. 95 First, the market at its
broadest includes the "issuers and holders of all fixed-income securities,
whatever their source or ultimate destination.', 96 With regard to this market,
Justice Souter noted that there is no preference given to local issuers of
bonds, and thus, no discrimination under the negative Commerce Clause.97
The narrower market of municipal bond funds was next identified as all
federally tax-exempt municipal bonds.
While here, "the distinction
participant. Id. He suggested that the state can act in the dual roles of a regulator and a market
participant and still fall within the rubric of the market participation doctrine. Id. Such a theory
might be called a dual purpose theory and could more properly be seen as a subset of the broader
market participation doctrine. In any event, Justice Souter stated that in Alexandria Scrap, the State
of Maryland essentially entered the market for hulks when it attempted to "'bid up [the] price"' in
order to encourage the more efficient disposal of the automobile relics. Id (quoting Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976)). He also argued that the scheme was regulatory
in nature, like the tax here, but the fact that Maryland also acted as a market participant was enough
for the Court in Alexandria Scrap to find that the Maryland statute did not violate the negative
Commerce Clause. Id. Although Chief Justice Roberts did not analyze United Haulers under the
market participation doctrine, Justice Souter was more than willing to make an argument for him
retroactively in Davis; he suggested that United Haulers is another example of a state acting as both
a market regulator and a market participant because there, while the public authority was acting as a
market participant by processing waste, it was able to do so because of the government's regulations
that forced private haulers to bring waste to the Authority's facility. Id. The regulation in United
Haulers (the ordinance) helped the public entity perform better in the market, just like Kentucky's
regulation (the tax) helped the state improve its market performance.
94. Id at 1814 (plurality opinion) ("In sum, our cases on market regulation without market
participation prescribe standard dormant Commerce Clause analysis; our cases on market
participation joined with regulation (the usual situation) prescribe exceptional treatment for this
direct governmental activity in commercial markets for the public's benefit.").
95. Id at 1815.
96. Id. This is the broadest formulation of the bond market and includes all public and private
issuers. Id.
97. Id. Private bonds issued within the state of Kentucky are not given the same preferential
treatment that Kentucky grants itself in issuing bonds. Id. Therefore, Justice Souter's argument with
regard to the market as a whole is that every private entity which sells bonds is treated exactly the
same under the taxation scheme.
98. Id Per Internal Revenue Code § 103(a), "gross income does not include interest on any State
or local bond." I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006); see supra note 74. However, it should be noted that this tax
exemption is a congressionally created benefit for the states and their subdivisions and that the
federal government could take the benefit away at any time. The Supreme Court considered whether
states have a constitutional right to be free from federal income taxation of their locally-issued debts
in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). Therein, South Carolina argued that a federal
statute which required municipals bonds to be registered in order for the holder to receive a federal
tax exemption was either a violation of the Tenth Amendment and federalist principles or,
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between the taxing State's bonds and their holders and issuers and holders of
out-of-state counterparts is at its most stark," the very fact that every state is
in favor of this scheme is an indication that the tax exemption should not
constitute a violation of the negative Commerce Clause.99
The third market for municipal bonds which Justice Souter identified
was the market for bonds within a single state, often consisting of single
state funds. 00 These single state funds have the ability to absorb the bonds
issued by smaller municipalities, which, as Justice Souter argued, the
national market often disregards.'o' Without the differential taxation scheme
alternatively, a violation of the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. Id. at 507-08. The
Court flatly rejected the idea that the United States lacked the power to tax municipal bonds, holding
that a federal tax on municipal bonds violated neither the Tenth Amendment nor the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity. Id at 527. However, it seems unlikely that the federal government
would ever completely remove the tax exemption from the Internal Revenue Code. It has been
argued that from the creation of the Sixteenth Amendment, creating the power in the federal
government to tax income, it was understood that the United States would never tax the obligations
of the states and their subdivisions. Maxwell A. Miller & Mark A. Glick, The Resurgence of
Federalism: The Casefor Tax-Exempt Bonds, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 25, 44 (1997) ("Despite the
Sixteenth Amendment's explicit language that Congress could tax income 'from whatever source
derived,' assurances were given by amendment proponents that interest income on state and local
obligations would be exempt."(quoting U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI) (footnote omitted)).
99. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1815. In the States' brief as amici, they argued that the States' right to
determine how their own debt is financed was recognized by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist.
Brief for the States, supra note 5, at I (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)). The
States warned that if the differential taxation scheme were overturned, there would be "staggering
potential liability," a loss in the value of bonds, and increasing costs of borrowing in the future. Id.
at 1-2. The States also made the argument that within this discrete market, Kentucky was not
similarly situated to other bond sellers because "no other bond issuer is in the business of providing
public works within the State of Kentucky." Id. at 3. The dissent's resistance to this argument is
palpable as Justice Kennedy argued that the fact that so many states have such a taxation scheme is
all the more reason to invalidate them. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1829 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy did, however, admit that "[t]he concern is legitimate" that there would be a disruption in
the market for bonds if differential taxation were invalidated. Id. at 1830.
100. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1816 (majority opinion). Large portfolios of municipal bonds are often
created so that the investing public may buy into a bond fund without the small, but not insignificant,
risk of investing in a single municipal bond. For example, Vanguard offers a fund intended only for
California residents that is comprised of bonds issued by California municipalities. See VanguardCalifornia Long-Term Tax-Exempt Fund Investor Shares, https:/lpersonal.vanguard.com/us/funds/
snapshot?Fundld=0075&FundlntExt-INT#hist::tab=0 (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). The Vanguard
California Long-Term Tax-Exempt Fund Investor Shares included, as of September 30, 2009, $3
billion in assets and 435 different municipal bonds. Id. Justice Kennedy heavily criticized the
notion that Kentucky was in some sort of discrete market apart from all others when it and its
subdivisions issue bonds. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He did, however,
seem to accept the notion that there is a discrete submarket for all state and municipal bonds due to
Internal Revenue Code § 103(a). Id. It seems that while Justice Kennedy was willing to accept the
legislatively created discrete market for municipal bonds on a national level, he was, for some
reason, unwilling to accept the legislatively created discrete market for bonds on the state level. See
id. Justice Kennedy can quibble over whether there should be a discrete market within each state for
municipal bonds, but the fact remains that the market for bonds in California is very different from
the market for bonds in Maine, with residents of each state naturally favoring their own bonds
because of state laws exempting gains from taxation.
101. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1816 (majority opinion). The State of Iowa Insurance Division
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the states employ, smaller municipalities might lose the only market-single
state funds-readily willing to purchase the bonds they issue.102 Justice
Souter summarized the importance of the tax scheme to the states by noting
that:
In sum, the differential tax scheme is critical to the operation of
an identifiable segment of the municipal financial market as it
currently functions, and this fact alone demonstrates that the
unanimous desire of the States to preserve the tax feature is a far cry
from the private protectionism that has driven the development of
the [negative] Commerce Clause.'o3

highlights the problem by noting that "[m]unicipal bonds for very small projects have very small or
'thinly traded' resale markets. A bond from a small issue may be very hard to resell at a price close
to the original purchase price." Iowa Insurance Division, Municipal Bonds, http://www.iid.state.
ia.us/investor_ed/muni.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). Municipal bonds issued by smaller cities for
smaller projects have much less demand on the open market due to their general lack of liquidity.
See id. Without the single state bond funds, smaller municipalities might have serious trouble
funding their city projects with debt financing. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1816.
102. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1816. Justice Souter argued that if the differential taxation scheme were
invalidated, the single state funds would probably cease to exist, as their primary advantage is in the
fact that they offer tax-free returns to in-state investors. Id. In a brief in support of neither party, the
National Federation of Municipal Analysts provided great insight into the problems which would
emerge if single state funds no longer existed. See Brief for the National Federation of Municipal
Analysts, as Amicus Curiae In Support of Neither Party, Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S.
Ct. 1801 (2008) (No. 06-666), 2007 WL 2115441. They argued that national mutual funds do not
bother to look at relatively small municipal bonds since the amount of capital they must invest
makes it cumbersome to research relatively tiny investment opportunities. Id. at 15. Single state
funds, on the other hand, are more than willing to research smaller municipal bonds because single
state funds' only possible investments are state and municipal bonds. Id. ("Because a single state
fund is required to invest substantially all of its assets in municipal bonds issued in one specific state,
the analysts and portfolio managers assigned to a single state fund focus on the full spectrum of
municipal bond issuers of the applicable state in a manner that analysts and portfolio managers of
national mutual funds do not.").
103. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817. Justice Souter noted that there is no indication that the national
market would be more welcoming of and interested in small municipal bonds if the tax scheme were
invalidated. Id. at 1816. The Davises themselves argued that this market reorientation would be a
good thing. Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Petition at II n.5, Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v.
Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008) (No. 06-666), 2007 WL 128601. They noted in their brief that
because municipalities would have a tougher time getting funding without the tax incentives if their
claim were upheld, "[r]ather than being coerced by competing state tax codes to invest in their home
states' projects-even if those bonds are less secure or fund less beneficial projects than those sold
by competing states-[investors would be able to] choose their debt investments from a wider
menu." Id. In this way, the Davises argued, states would be forced to create better projects and fund
them more efficiently, all while proving to the marketplace that the proposed investment was sound.
Id
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Finally, the majority opinion discussed the application of the Pike
balancing test.'0 However, before discussing the balancing required under
Pike, Justice Souter immediately questioned whether this type of case could
even be resolved by Pike. 05 Leaving this question unresolved, he stated that

104. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817. Justice Souter stated that "the courtroom door [is generally left]
open to plaintiffs invoking the rule in Pike, that even nondiscriminatory burdens on commerce may
be struck down on a showing that those burdens clearly outweigh the benefits of a state or local
practice." Id. Pike has long been a subject of criticism, inter alia, because the balancing the Court
must undergo is essentially meaningless. In almost all cases where the Court has decided that a
statute is not per se discriminatory, it will have trouble finding that the burden of the law outweighs
the benefit. See Stanley E. Cox, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Court Confusion About the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 155, 170 (1997) ("The problem with the Court's insistence
that it evaluate either under a deferential Pike or a presumptively unconstitutional per se test is that it
is not always clear which test should apply, yet the test becomes nearly determinative of the result.
If the Pike test is used, the presumption will be that the statute should stand, until and unless the
opponent can demonstrate that alternatives which burden commerce less can still accomplish the
state's goals."). Other scholars have suggested that the Court has found it necessary to give the
appearance that it engaged in a balancing approach, because otherwise "[the Court] would have to
admit it was engaged in motive review, which it is obviously loath to do." Donald H. Regan, The
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MIClH.
L. REV. 1091, 1285-86 (1986) (noting that "[i]f the Court is engaged in motive review but does not
want to say so, balancing talk provides an ideal cover. Protectionist effect balancing, and especially
weak protectionist effect balancing (with the 'clearly excessive' test), comes as close to mimicking
motive review as any non-purpose-based test could be expected to come."). Even if a case does
reach the Pike stage of analysis, Justice Souter previously suggested in General Motors Corp. v.
Tracy that the Pike analysis still turns on "the discriminatory character of the ... state regulation[]."
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 n.12 (1997). Another commentator suggested that
the outcome of a Pike balancing test is so unpredictable that the analysis is analogous to chaos
theory in that the outcome is subject to random chance. See James D. Fox, State Benefits Under the
Pike Balancing Test of the Dormant Commerce Clause: Putative or Actual?, I AVE MARIA L. REV.
175, 177 (2003) (arguing that "attractors, or legal rules, that should produce predictable analytical
paths, given a certain starting set of facts, are not clear.").
105. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817. The Court, according to Justice Souter, has not traditionally
discussed Pike balancing in tandem with a market participation doctrine analysis. Id. He did note,
however, that United Haulers included a Pike balancing analysis. Id. In United Haulers, Chief
Justice Roberts flatly stated that the flow control ordinances in question should be analyzed under
Pike. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1797
(2007). The analysis the Chief Justice provided was bare and only reflected the Court's opinion that
the flow control ordinance was a net good. Id. at 1797-98. The United Haulers Court stated that the
benefits included revenue generation and recycling, which would lead to health and environmental
benefits. Id. at 1798. And, "[i]f the haulers could take waste to any disposal site, achieving an equal
level of enforcement would be much more costly, if not impossible." Id. Pursuant to this analysis,
the Chief Justice concluded that there was no need "to decide whether the ordinances impose any
incidental burden on interstate commerce because any arguable burden does not exceed the public
benefits of the ordinances" consequently, the law was upheld. Id at 1797. Justice Scalia mocked
the plurality for applying Pike, stating that the Constitution dictated that Congress would balance the
priorities of the people, not the judiciary. Id. at 1799 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Chief Justice
Roberts did not indicate that stare decisis was his main impetus for applying Pike, but it may very
well be that that was the case. Elsewhere in his opinion, the Chief Justice seemed to side with
Justice Scalia that the Court should not be in the business of balancing benefits and burdens. Id at
1796 (majority opinion) ("It is not the office of the Commerce Clause to control the decision of the
voters on whether government or the private sector should provide waste management services.
'The Commerce Clause significantly limits the ability of States and localities to regulate or
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even if Pike should be applied to market participant doctrine cases, "the
current record and scholarly material convince us that the Judicial Branch is
not institutionally suited to draw reliable conclusions" which are needed to
apply Pike.'06 The Court noted that in order to apply Pike to this case, it
would be required to undergo a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether
the burden of the tax scheme outweighed the benefit.'o Justice Souter
indicated that while Pike is normally hard to apply, it is especially hard to
apply given the complex subject matter at hand. 08 He noted that with regard
otherwise burden the flow of interstate commerce, but it does not elevate free trade above all other
values."' (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986))).
106. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817.
107. Id. at 1818. The Davises suggested that the differential taxation scheme caused harm to at
least five different entities: (1) out-of-state issuers; (2) out-of-state private sellers; (3) the national
municipal bond market; (4)Kentucky investors; and (5) the states themselves. Brief for Respondents
at 9, Dep't of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008) (No. 06-666), 2007 WL
2808463. In response, Justice Souter noted that engaging in an analysis of the cost-benefit ratio for
each affected entity "would be a very subtle exercise." Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1818. What he seemed
to be saying is that such an analysis would be too complicated for the Court. Instead, he merely
returned to his standby argument that all of the other states support the taxation scheme, so the
burden apparently must be minimal. See id. He went on to note the difficulty of the subject matter
at hand, questioning whether any court could properly analyze whether smaller municipalities would
be put at such a disadvantage in invalidating the law that it should instead remain in effect. Id.
Further, "any attempt to place a definite value on this feature of the existing system would have to
confront the what-if questions." Id. Justice Souter is certainly right in noting that there would be
"what-if questions," but the more important point he failed to mention is that there would be "whatif questions" in every single case where the Court applies Pike. Other commentators have agreed
that the Pike balancing test is inherently flawed in that it requires a judge to weigh the burdens and
benefits of a statute without any real knowledge or guidance. See Michael J. Ruttinger, Is There a
Dormant ExtraterritorialityPrinciple?: Commerce Clause Limits on State Antitrust Laws, 106
MICH. L. REv. 545, 565 (2007).
108. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1818. It seems somewhat odd that Justice Souter confined his analysis of
Pike 's inadequacies to economic issues. He cited to both Tracy and Fulton Corp. in suggesting "the
unsuitability of the judicial process and judicial forums for making whatever predictions and
reaching whatever answers are possible at all" with regard to economic and taxation issues. Id.
(citing Tracy, 519 U.S. at 308 ("[T~he Court is institutionally unsuited to gather the facts upon which
economic predictions can be made, and professionally untrained to make them."); see also Fulton
Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 342 (1996) ("'[C]ourts as institutions are poorly equipped to
evaluate with precision the relative burdens of various methods of taxation. The complexities of
factual economic proof always present a certain potential for error. . . .' (quoting Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 589-90 (1983))). The Justices, as very
intelligent individuals, are certainly capable of understanding taxation and general economic issues
just as well as a legislator could. However, the issue is not comprehension of the subject material,
but rather the unwillingness of the Court to impede on Congress's policy choices with regard to
economics in general and taxation policies in particular. However, the Court should not confine its
unwillingness to interfere with policy objectives solely in the arena of economic and taxation issues.
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia suggested that the Court will remain incapable of properly
balancing policy objectives in every single case. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1821 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part). He noted that, "[o]f course you cannot decide which interest 'outweighs' the other without
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to economic issues, "[t]he complexities of factual economic proof always
present a certain potential for error," and thus the judicial branch is ill suited
to answer such cost-benefit questions.'09 Instead, Justice Souter suggested
that Congress, comprised of the people's elected representatives, is the most
appropriate body to consider whether the differential tax system is a benefit
that should be retained or a burden that should be eradicated." 0
Finally, Justice Souter closed by reiterating that the differential taxation
scheme has been a vital form of financing for nearly a century."' For him,
the risk of upsetting the bond market by ruling against Kentucky was too
great.11 2 In the end, "'[t]he fact that the system has been in force for a very
long time is of itself a strong reason. . . for leaving any improvement that
may be desired to the legislature."" 3
B. JusticeStevens's ConcurringOpinion

Justice Stevens's concurring opinion'14 is very interesting because he
previously joined Justices Alito and Kennedy in dissenting from the majority
in United Haulers."' In Davis, Justice Stevens distinguished the two cases
by saying that while United Haulers dealt with the state entering into a
private market, here, Kentucky did not "engage in [a] private trade or
deciding which interest is more important to you. And that will always be the case." Id.
109. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1818.
110. Id. at 1819. Justice Souter rightly advocated that Congress is the more appropriate forum to
resolve this issue for two reasons. Id. First, Congress has the ability to compile more information
regarding the advantages and disadvantages of the system, and second, Congress, as an elected body,
is more appropriately situated to take the economic risk of failure. Id. Again, however, Justice
Souter's remarks beg the question-if Congress is the more appropriate body to make the policy
decision in this case, won't they always be better suited to make it? Is there ever a time when
Congress will have less of an ability to gather information, or when Congress, as an elected body,
will not be more responsible to the people than the Court?
I 11. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id (quoting Paddell v. City of New York, 211 U.S. 446, 448 (1908)). This line of reasoning
certainly seems to intimate that the fact that the system has been in place for such a long time
without intervention by Congress means that the Court should not interfere with it. Such reasoning
would certainly resonate with Justices Scalia and Thomas, who would prefer that the Court abstain
from adjudicating cases under the negative Commerce Clause. See infra note 130 and
accompanying text.
114. Justice Stevens also joined the majority opinion in full. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1804.
115. Id at 1819 (Stevens, J., concurring). Recall that in UnitedHaulers, the Court first made the
public interest versus private interest distinction in a negative Commerce Clause setting and held that
because the discriminatory law would benefit the public central waste management authority and
treat all private companies, whether in or out-of-state, the same, the law was acceptable and was not
discriminatory under the negative Commerce Clause. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1795 (2007). The dissent, which Justice Stevens joined
at that time, squarely rejected the notion that such a public-private distinction even existed, saying
that "[t]he public-private distinction drawn by the Court is both illusory and without precedent." Id
at 1804 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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business.""'6 He moved on to state that Kentucky's decision not to tax the
bonds was done merely to "enhance[] the marketability of Kentucky bonds
in the Kentucky market, motivating local support for local public
improvements.""' Justice Stevens concluded that instituting a tax break to
encourage people to lend money to the state is not something which
necessitates judicial scrutiny under the negative Commerce Clause." 8
116. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1820 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens's rationale with regard to
whether Kentucky entered into a private trade or business seems somewhat amiss. He explained that
"if a State merely borrows money 'to pay for spending on transportation, public safety, education,
utilities, and environmental protection,' . . .it does not 'operat[e] a commercial enterprise' for
purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause." Id. (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511
U.S. 383, 399 (1994)). He then went on to quote from the United Haulers dissent, which he had
joined, and stated, "[a] State's reliance on 'general taxes or municipal bonds' to finance public
projects does not merit the same Commerce Clause scrutiny as 'operating a fee-for-service business
enterprise in an area in which there is an established interstate market."' Id. (quoting United
Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1794 (Alito, J., dissenting)). Justice Stevens, attempting to maneuver away
from his previous position that there is no public-private distinction under the negative Commerce
Clause, seemed to stretch the definition of a fee-for-service enterprise by claiming that when a state
issues a bond to pay for needed services, it has not engaged in a private trade or business. Justice
Stevens then contradicted himself, apparently realizing that municipal bonds are part of a larger
bond trading market, when he stated that "[bly issuing bonds in lieu of increasing taxes, Kentucky
has enlarged the interstate marketfor securities." Id. (emphasis added). This of course, is part of
the larger issue which the dissent emphasized, as Justice Kennedy insisted that it isn't even the
issuance of bonds that is at issue; rather, it is the preferential way that the state chose to exclude the
bonds from income taxation. Id. at 1825 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The challenged state activity is
differential taxation, not bond issuance. The state tax provision at issue could be repealed tomorrow
without altering or impairing a single obligation in the bonds. It is the tax that matters; and
Kentucky gives favored tax treatment to some securities but not others depending solely upon the
State of issuance, and it does so to disadvantage bonds from other States.").
117. Id. at 1820 (Stevens, J., concurring). The irony of Justice Stevens's statement is that he
suggested that the tax exemption enhanced the position of the bonds in the marketplace while
continuing to claim that the bonds are not actually in a market at all. He went on to state that
"[i]nstead of issuing bonds, Kentucky could have borrowed funds from a Kentucky bank or issued
notes to a syndicate of Kentucky lenders without implicating the Commerce Clause." Id However,
here again he seems to miss the point that it is the taxation of the bonds rather than the issuance of
them that is the main issue for the Davises. The more apt analogy would be if the state borrowed
funds from a Kentucky bank and then offered the bank a tax break in exchange for a lower interest
rate on the money borrowed.
118. Id. at 1820-21. The exact language of Justice Stevens's closing remarks is interesting in that
it impliedly recognizes a public-private distinction. Id. Justice Stevens stated that "[i]n my
judgment state action that motivates the State's taxpayers to lend money to the State is simply not
the sort of 'burden' on interstate commerce that is implicated by our dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence." Id (emphasis added). Justice Stevens's entire argument is predicated on the fact
that the state itself is the recipient and beneficiary of the bonds. The Court's opinion did not
consider whether the state could exempt taxes on bonds which funded projects for private entities.
Id. at 1805 n.2 (majority opinion). Based upon Justice Stevens's comments, he very well might not
allow such a tax break, because it is not the state borrowing money for its own purposes. While this
would seem to be the very sort of public-private distinction the Court adopted, nowhere in Justice
Stevens's concurrence did he actually adopt the distinction. Id. at 1819-21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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C. ChiefJusticeRoberts's ConcurrenceIn Part

Chief Justice Roberts was very brief in his concurrence, noting that he
joined all parts of Justice Souter's opinion except for Part III-B, in which
Justice Souter discussed the application of the market participant doctrine."'9
In the Chief Justice's view, the case was adequately decided by the rule
announced in United Haulers, with no need to apply what he called the
"alternative analysis" of the market participant doctrine. 120
D. Justice Scalia's ConcurrenceIn Part

Justice Scalia began his concurrence' 2 1 by stating that he joined the
opinion of the Court with the exception of its discussion of the market
participant doctrine and the Pike balancing test.122 His analysis turned on
whether or not stare decisis demanded that he apply the negative Commerce
Clause.123 Here, Justice Scalia determined that stare decisis did not compel
Therefore, his concurrence here seems to be somewhat of an anomaly based upon the unique fact
situation of a state borrowing money. Based upon his refusal to renege on his dissent in United
Haulers, it seems likely that Justice Stevens would rejoin Justices Kennedy and Alito dissenting in a
different case in which the Court attempts to apply the civic responsibility exception. See id. at
1819.
119. Id at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part).
120. Id. Here, a rift in how the Court wants to construct its new doctrine is apparent. Chief
Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for the Court in UnitedHaulers, but he did not include an analysis
under the market participant doctrine. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1789-98. This indicates
that he would prefer that the Court's new exception to the negative Commerce Clause stand out as a
separate exception from the market participant doctrine. It is, however, somewhat odd that the Chief
Justice apparently assigned the opinion to Justice Souter, whose writing on the market participant
doctrine in connection with the newly recognized public-private exception was only favored by two
other members of the Court. See G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The
Nineteenth-CenturyLegacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1463, 1476 (2006) ("The current assignment power
of the Chief Justice exists in a context in which cases set for disposition by the Court's conference
are discussed in a regular order, based on seniority, and in which the Chief Justice is expected to
assign opinions when he is with the majority and the most senior associate Justice with the majority
to assume that role when the Chief opposes the majority's disposition."). The Chief Justice perhaps
assigned the opinion to Justice Souter based upon the latter's strong dissent in Carbone, in which he
unleashed the first volley in the public-private debate. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 419-422 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting). Whatever the reasoning, Justice
Souter took full advantage of his assignment. He not only applied the market participation doctrine
to the facts in Davis, but he also went back and displayed how United Haulers could be analyzed
under the market participation doctrine. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1813. (plurality opinion). Chief Justice
Roberts could not have been happy, as he retorted that the case at hand was "readily resolved" by the
civic responsibility exception announced in United Haulers and that a majority of the Court shared
his view. Id at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part).
121. Justice Scalia joined Justice Souter's majority opinion except as to Part Ill-B and Part IV. Id.
at 1821 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
122. Id. Like the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia did not feel a need to join Part Ill-B's discussion of
the market participant doctrine because the case had already been resolved by Part III-A. Id.; see
supra note 120.
123. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1821 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Justice Scalia's hesitance to apply
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him to apply the negative Commerce Clause because doing so would expand
the scope of the doctrine and interfere with the states' right to regulate.124
Thus, because the negative Commerce Clause is inapplicable in his
analytical framework, Justice Scalia was unable to find fault with
Kentucky's differential taxation scheme.125
Justice Scalia next discussed the application of the Pike balancing test.
He chose not to join the majority's analysis of Pike, not because he thought

the negative Commerce Clause is likely an extension of his belief that the Court incorrectly
interpreted the Commerce Clause when it recognized an implied restriction on the states. Justice
Scalia has previously stated that "the so-called 'negative' Commerce Clause is an unjustified judicial
invention, not to be expanded beyond its existing domain." Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S.
278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). While Justice Scalia is loathe to apply the negative
Commerce Clause, he has shown a willingness to apply it where stare decisis demands that he do so.
For instance, in 1988 Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous Court in New Energy, stating in broad,
sweeping terms that "[i]t has long been accepted that the Commerce Clause not only grants Congress
the authority to regulate commerce among the States, but also directly limits the power of the States
to discriminate against interstate commerce." New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,
273 (1988). For Justice Scalia today, the negative Commerce Clause should only be applied where
necessary to help create the national market the founders envisioned when creating the Commerce
Clause. Justice Scalia has been adamant in stating that:
In our zeal to advance this policy [of creating a national marketplace], however, we must
take care not to overstep our mandate, for the Commerce Clause was not intended "to cut
the States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life, and safety of their
citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country."
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 596 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960)). What
Justice Scalia seems to offer is both an originalist interpretation of the Constitution mingled with a
belief in the importance of federalism. However, Justice Kennedy argued that this is exactly the type
of case where the Court would not be overstepping its mandate because of the need to protect the
national marketplace from a discriminatory law. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1826 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("Differential taxation favoring local trade over interstate commerce poses serious threats to the
national free market because the taxing power is at once so flexible and so potent.").
124. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1821 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Because of his interpretation of the
Constitution, Justice Scalia will only apply the negative Commerce Clause when a state law that
either "facially discriminates against interstate commerce" or "is indistinguishable from a type of
law previously held unconstitutional by this Court" is challenged. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). This case fits into neither
category, and in Justice Scalia's opinion, applying the negative Commerce Clause to this situation
would impermissibly expand the doctrine. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1821 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
It is interesting to note that part of Justice Scalia's rationale is that Kentucky was performing a
traditional government function. Id. The dissent blasted both Justice Scalia's partial concurrence
and the majority opinion for referring to the importance of traditional government functions. Id. at
1824 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy felt that it was an error to rely on traditional
government functions and responsibilities in upholding the Kentucky statute. Id. As Justice
Kennedy stated, the focus on traditional government functions "is but a reformulation of the phrase
'police power,' long abandoned as a mere tautology. It is difficult to identify any state law that has
come before us that would not meet the Court's description." Id.
125. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1821 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
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that it should not have been applied in this specific case, but rather because
he thought that it should not be applied in any case.' 26 To apply Pike here,
Justice Scalia explained, "is a matter not of weighing apples against apples,
but of deciding whether three apples are better than six tangerines."' 2 7

126. Id. The Court had declined to apply Pike in this case because the judicial branch is ill suited
to weigh the costs and benefits of a differential taxation scheme like the one at issue. Id. at 1818
(majority opinion); see supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia stated that Pike
should never be applied because "courts are less well suited than Congress to perform this kind of
balancing in every case." Id at 1821 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's argument is that in
every negative Commerce Clause case when the Court applies Pike, it will necessarily have to
balance the interests of discrimination against nondiscrimination. Id. In doing so, the Court will
have to make a policy decision as to whether discrimination is better for reason X or
nondiscrimination is better for reason Y. Id In Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises,
Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring), Justice Scalia suggested that Pike should be
abandoned because the interests on either side will always be incommensurate. In Pike's place,
Justice Scalia suggested a test under which "a state statute is invalid under the Commerce Clause if,
and only if, it accords discriminatory treatment to interstate commerce in a respect not required to
achieve a lawful state purpose." Id. at 898. He would then leave to Congress the determination of
whether the state purpose was important enough to be a burden on interstate commerce. Id. Justice
Scalia has apparently shifted his view on Pike. In his dissent in Camps Newfound, one of the ways
that Justice Scalia suggested to the Court that it could find the Maine statute (which gave tax benefits
to charities serving primarily Maine residents) valid was "on the ground that it does not constitute
'facial discrimination' against interstate commerce and readily survives the Pike v. Bruce Church
balancing test." Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting). His argument in Camps
Newfound may have been motivated by his knowledge that since the Court has not abandoned Pike,
he had to play by the rules and suggest an alternative that was at least theoretically acceptable to the
Court. Despite the fact that Camps Newfound was decided just over ten years ago, today Justice
Scalia again "would abandon the Pike-balancing enterprise altogether and leave these
quintessentially legislative judgments with the branch to which the Constitution assigns them."
Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1821 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). In his concurrence, Justice Thomas did not
directly refer to the Pike balancing test, but did state that he "would entirely 'discard the Court's
negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence."' Id. at 1822 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)
(quoting United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1799 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)). In doing so, he
would of necessity also have to discard the Pike balancing test. See id at 1822. Although Justice
Thomas declined to discuss Pike at length in this opinion, he has written directly about Pike
balancing in the past. For instance, in his scholarly dissent in Camps Newfound, Justice Thomas
stated that "[w]e have used the Clause to make policy-laden judgments that we are ill equipped and
arguably unauthorized to make." Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 618 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas went on to state that of the many problems with Pike, two of the largest are that it
"invites us, if not compels us, to function more as legislators than as judges" and that such balancing
tests have "allowed us to reach different results based merely 'on differing assessments of the force
of competing analogies."' Id. at 619-20 (quoting Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514
U.S. 175, 196 n.7 (1995)). Justice Thomas, like Justice Scalia, would allow Congress to retain the
sole power to make such competing policy decisions. Id at 620.
127. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1821 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Davis was not the first case in
which Justice Scalia penned such a witty analogy. In Bendix, Justice Scalia stated that applying the
Pike balancing test is "like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is
heavy." Bendix, 486 U.S. at 897 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). As currently constituted,
the Court seems to increasingly disfavor the use of Pike. As five other members joined Justice
Souter's majority opinion stating that it would be improper to apply Pike in this instance, and two
other members have called for the outright rejection of Pike, the vast majority of the Court seems
aligned against making legislative policy judgments, especially in economic policy cases like Davis.
See Davis. 128 S. Ct. at 1804-30
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E. Justice Thomas's Concurrence in Judgment

Justice Thomas concurred with the judgment of the Court 28 that
Kentucky's differential taxation scheme was constitutional, but for an
entirely different reason than what Justice Souter's majority opinion
proposed.129 Justice Thomas found the scheme to be constitutional because,
under his interpretation of the Constitution, there should not be a negative
Commerce Clause. 30 Consequently, the taxation scheme could not possibly
be a violation of a doctrine that should not exist.' ' Justice Thomas noted
that the taxation scheme that Kentucky employs is not only commonplace
currently, but has been utilized by states for decades.1 32 He reasoned that

128. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1821-22 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). While Justice Thomas
agreed with the ultimate result of the majority opinion, he did not agree with the analysis and did not
join any part of the majority opinion. Id.
129. Id
130. Id Justice Thomas took Justice Scalia's argument to its logical conclusion. Rather than
relying on stare decisis to justify application of the negative Commerce Clause in limited
circumstances, Justice Thomas instead argued that the negative Commerce Clause should be entirely
discarded. Id. Justice Thomas has formerly stated that "[t]he negative Commerce Clause has no
basis in the Constitution and has proved unworkable in practice." United Haulers Ass'n v. OneidaHerkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1799 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). One of
the largest problems with the negative Commerce Clause from Justice Thomas's perspective is that
because it is not rooted in the text of the Constitution, the application of the doctrine turns on the
Court's preference for one policy over another. Id. at 1800. Justice Thomas reasoned that "the text
of the Constitution makes clear that the Legislature-not the Judiciary-bears the responsibility of
curbing what it perceives as state regulatory burdens on interstate commerce." Davis, 128 S. Ct. at
1822 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
131. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1822 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Because Congress has been
silent with regard to the states' differential taxation schemes, Justice Thomas stated that "we have no
authority to invalidate Kentucky's differential tax scheme." Id.
132. Id. The majority opinion also noted that all states, even those that do not have a similar tax
plan, supported Kentucky in this litigation. Id. at 1818 (majority opinion) ("It is striking, after all,
that most of the harms allegedly flowing directly or indirectly to Kentucky's sister States and their
citizens have failed to dissuade even a single State from supporting the current system; every one of
them, including States with no income tax, have lined up with Kentucky in this case."). The dissent
found this argument to be completely unavailing. See id. at 1828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy stated that the fact that every other state lined up behind Kentucky did not matter because
"[p]rotectionist interests always want the laws they pass, even if their fellow citizens bear the
burden." Id. However, Justice Kennedy did not seem to account for the states that do not have a
bond differential taxation scheme (largely those that lack a state income tax) and yet still support the
scheme employed by other states. The amici curiae brief onto which all states signed that tells the
real story as to why every state wanted this long-practiced taxation scheme to remain in place. See
Brief for the States, supra note 5. As explained by the amici, had Justices Kennedy and Alito
prevailed in affirming the ruling of the Kentucky court below, it would have "put the 'bond market
into an unprecedented upheaval,"' and would cause bonds held by residents of all fifty states to be
substantially devalued. Id. at 1 (quoting Timothy P. Noonan & David Martin, U.S. Supreme Court's
Decision to Hear Municipal Bond Case Raises Constitutional,ProceduralQuestions, 44 STATE TAX
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because Congress has had nearly a century to regulate in this area, but has
chosen not to do so, the Court has no authority to step in and regulate in
place of Congress. 33 His reasoning in this case also comports with his longheld view that the Pike balancing test should be removed from the Court's

jurisprudence.134

F. Justice Kennedy's Dissent

Justice Kennedy began his dissent by referencing the importance of free
trade to the founding of the United States.' 3 ' His dissent suggested that it is
NOTES 969 (2007). It is apparent that Justice Thomas was correct in his reasoning that the
differential taxation system should continue, at least in part, because the bond market needs stability
in order to properly function.
133. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1822. In his dissent in Camps Newfound, Justice Thomas made a very
interesting argument with regard to the constitutionality of the Court stepping in to enforce the
Commerce Clause without Congress having acted first. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v.
Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 617 (1997). Justice Thomas approached the issue from a statutory
interpretation standpoint, noting that some people have advanced the theory that with silence,
Congress could have attempted to preempt the field. Id. He stated that the idea of legislation by
silence may be impermissible because of the Constitutionally mandated requirements of
bicameralism and presentment. Id; see U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have
passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to
the President of the United States . . . ."); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 3 ("Every Order, Resolution, or
Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be
necessary ... shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take
Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the
Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case
of a Bill."). Justice Thomas went on to state that "even were we wrongly to assume that
congressional silence evidenced a desire to pre-empt some undefined category of state
laws,... treating unenacted congressional intent as if it were law would be constitutionally
dubious." Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 617 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The states certainly support
Justice Thomas in his argument here. In their Brief as amici, the states noted that "' [t]he long
continued silence of Congress, with its plenary power, in the presence of. . . [state legislation] is
itself an implied ratification and adoption, and is equivalent in its consequences to an express
declaration to that effect."' Brief for the States, supra note 5, at 20 (quoting Wilson v. McNamee,
102 U.S. 572, 575 (1880)). The states went on to point out that Congress was aware of the
differential taxation scheme in place at the state level here because in 1959 Congress had ordered a
report to look at state taxation practices and after noting the differential taxation of bonds, took no
steps to stop the practice. Id. at 20-21.
134. Justice Thomas would entirely eradicate the Pike balancing test. Camps Newfound, 520 U.S.
at 619-20. In Camps Newfound, Justice Thomas stated that "in an unabashedly legislative manner,
we have balanced that 'effect' against the perceived interests of the taxing or regulating State." Id
at 619. He maintained that the test is constructed in such a way as to effectively compel the Court to
act as legislators rather than as judges. Id A further problem with Pike is that it has allowed the
Court to reach results predicated only upon policy considerations and competing analogies. Id This
certainly seems to be in line with Justice Souter's assessment of Pike's usefulness in this case. See
supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text. As Justice Souter noted, "the current record and
scholarly material convince us that the Judicial Branch is not institutionally suited to draw reliable
conclusions of the kind that would be necessary for the Davises to satisfy a Pike burden in this
particular case." Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817; see supra note I10 and accompanying text.
135. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1822 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated that free trade
was a primary objective of the founders. Id. He went on to suggest that "[t]he national, free
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necessary "to discourage new experiments with local laws that discriminate
against interstate commerce and trade." 36 Justice Kennedy reasoned that
while the bond market at issue here may be able to deal with such
discrimination, the holding of the Court impermissibly undermines negative
Commerce Clause jurisprudence-a holding that may lead to discrimination
13
in other discrete markets and more damaging outcomes. 1 In discussing the
merits of this case, Justice Kennedy noted that traditionally the Court has
found unconstitutional "laws that impose unreasonable burdens upon
interstate commerce; and laws that discriminate against it."' He stated that
because of the Court's active participation in this area, national legislation
39
has not been needed to end discriminatory practices.1
market ... has been a singular force in shaping the consciousness and creating the reality that we are
one in purpose and destiny." Id. He went on to call the Court's decisions under the Commerce
Clause both "appropriate and necessary to [achieve] the Constitution's purpose." Id. Justice
Kennedy noted that before the adoption of the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation had
allowed states to enact protectionist laws. Id. at 1823. Professor Robert N. Clinton argues that the
failure of the founders to provide for federal power over interstate commerce in the Articles of
Confederation stemmed from the fact that most contemporary commerce took place between the
colonies and Europe and the Indian tribes, not between the actual colonies themselves. Robert N.
Clinton, A BrieffHistory ofthe Adoption ofthe United States Constitution, 75 IOWA L. REV. 891, 894
(1990). The result was increasing competition among the states and numerous barriers to trade.
Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1823 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
136. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1823 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the majority's
decision was inconsistent with the Court's precedent. Id. In this sense, the dissent seemed to be
grasping onto Carbone and to their own dissenting argument in United Haulers. In United Haulers,
Justice Alito dissented by arguing that "[t]he fact that the flow control laws at issue discriminate in
favor of a government-owned enterprise does not meaningfully distinguish this case from Carbone."
United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1804 (2007)
(Alito, J., dissenting). But of course, Justice Alito lost that battle, and it indeed became meaningful,
however nominally, that the facility in operation in United Haulers was owned by the public
whereas the operation in Carbone was private. Therefore, to say that the decision in Davis was
inconsistent with the Court's precedent is categorically wrong. In the only other case where the
Court considered a statute which benefited a public entity, the Court found no violation of the
negative Commerce Clause. Id.at 1797.
137. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1822 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated that the so-called
discrimination the Court upheld could be managed, despite extra accommodation costs. Id
However, it would seem that the greater accommodation costs would be in scrapping the system
altogether. One amici suggested that if the Court were to invalidate the taxation scheme, "the
disruption to the existing municipal bond market, and the adjustment from a system that has
prevailed for close to a century, would be substantial." Brief for the National Federation of
Municipal Analysts, supra note 102, at 16. The amici further noted that if the Davises had won,
there would have been a period of uncertainty during which investors would be unsure how
municipal bonds would be taxed, leading to a devaluation of outstanding bonds and difficulty in
selling new bonds. Id. at 22.
138. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
139. Id. ("The result is to eliminate the demand and necessity for sweeping national legislation.").
If saving Congress the trouble of legislating is the goal, perhaps Justice Kennedy would be pleased
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Justice Kennedy began his analysis by first noting and then rejecting the
Court's reliance on the assertion that Kentucky's bond scheme serves a
traditional government function.140 The dissent stated that the Court's
reliance on traditional government functions is merely a disguise for a state's
police powers and that a claim of police powers cannot save a law from
scrutiny under the negative Commerce Clause.141
to have the Court take over other legislative functions. But alas, the Supreme Court as legislator is
not delineated in the Constitution. Article 1, Section I of the United States Constitution clearly and
unequivocally establishes that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S. CONsT.
art. I, § 1. Conversely, "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme
Court." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Contrary to Justice Kennedy's assertion, the founders apparently
never contemplated giving the Court the power to legislate. Indeed, some constitutional scholars
have suggested that the Court should simply completely avoid all commercial cases. See, e.g.,
Steven Breker-Cooper, The Commerce Clause: The Casefor JudicialNon-Intervention, 69 OR. L.
REv. 895, 896 (1990). Professor Steven Breker-Cooper suggests that "[g]iven Congress' power to
preempt both state law and Court decisions in this area, however, there is considerably less need for
Court intervention. Thus ... the Court should no longer hear commercial cases." Id. (footnote
omitted).
140. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy suggested that the
Court vindicated Kentucky's bond scheme merely because it served a "beneficial purpose." Id.
However, the Court's decision was not so narrow as to suggest that any law which is beneficial must
be upheld. The distinction which the Court made was that laws that favor traditional government
functions and do not discriminate against private businesses are not discriminatory under the
Commerce Clause. Id. at 1811 (majority opinion); UnitedHaulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1790 ("Disposing
of trash has been a traditional government activity for years, and laws that favor the government in
such areas-but treat every private business, whether in-state or out-of-state, exactly the same-do
not discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the Commerce Clause.").
141. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy wrote that holding up a
state action as a police power is merely an end run around normal constitutional restraints. Id. The
case to which Justice Kennedy cited as authority was a curious choice, as the facts are not on all
fours with the scenario in Davis. Justice Kennedy cited to Justice Holmes's opinion for the Court in
Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Kaw Valley DrainageDistrict. Id. at 1824-25. That case, now
nearly 100 years old, dealt with the need to provide for transportation after the Kansas River flooded
its banks. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 233 U.S. 75, 76 (1914). In
response, the Kaw Valley Drainage District, on authority from the state, ordered the railroads to
remove their old bridges and build new ones at a greater height. Id The Court noted that because
the railroads were part of interstate commerce, the "subject-matter is under the exclusive control of
Congress." Id. at 78. Justice Holmes went on to state that, "[iut repeatedly has been said or implied
that a direct interference with commerce among the States could not be justified [with police
powers]." Id. at 79. The key, and very relevant, distinction between Davis and Kaw Valley is that
the latter involved a government entity attempting to use police powers in order to mandate that a
private entity take action. Davis contains no similar facts, and in fact all private bond issuers are
treated exactly alike by Kentucky's statute. This was the distinction Justice Souter drew-a
distinction that, apparently, Justice Kennedy failed to grasp. As Justice Souter wrote, "[u]nder
United Haulers, governmental public preference is constitutionally different from commercial
private preference, and we make the governmental responsibility enquiry to identify the beneficiary
as one or the other." Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811 n.9 (also noting that "[blecause this is the distinction
at which the enquiry about traditional governmental activity is aimed, it entails neither tautology nor
the hopeless effort to pick and choose among legitimate governmental activity"). Chief Justice
Roberts, in United Haulers, wrote that the Court should not do that for which Justice Kennedy
advocates: "rigorously scrutinize economic legislation passed under the auspices of the police
power." United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1798. The Chief Justice went on to state that "[t]here was a
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The dissent then discussed one of the major points of contentionwhether the challenge should be directed at Kentucky's issuance of bonds,
42
Kentucky's differential tax scheme, or the two provisions together as one.1
Justice Kennedy stated that the real "challenged state activity is differential
taxation, not bond issuance."l 43 Working from this premise, the dissent
found the case to be quite simple as a state cannot use its taxing powers to
create barriers to commerce in the interstate market.144 Justice Kennedy
stated that such discriminatory taxes "pose[] serious threats to the national

time when this Court presumed to make such binding judgments for society, ... [but] [w]e should
not seek to reclaim that ground for judicial supremacy under the banner of the dormant Commerce
Clause." Id. (citation omitted).
142. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
143. Id. Justice Kennedy suggested that the law at issue affects the purchasers of the bond, not the
issuer. Id. He went on to note that the state could easily get rid of the tax exemption, and its
obligations to repay the bonds would remain the same. Id. This is certainly true; however Justice
Kennedy misses the point. Kentucky does not have a tax exemption in order to somehow affect the
obligation that it owes to repay bonds. Certainly Justice Kennedy is right when he states that the tax
"could be repealed tomorrow without altering or impairing a single obligation in the bonds." Id.
However, it could not be repealed tomorrow without significantly affecting Kentucky's and its
political subdivisions' ability to sell new bonds. That is the entire purpose of the tax exemption-to
allow Kentucky to raise revenue, a traditional government function, for the benefit of its people. As
one amici noted, if the tax exemption were taken away, some government entities would have
trouble selling bonds at all, even at higher interest rates. Brief for the National Federation of
Municipal Analysts, supra note 102, at 19 ("Such smaller issuers would stand to lose much of the
intrastate market for the bonds that has developed under the currently prevailing state tax system
without gaining much of an interstate market from its elimination."). Undaunted, Justice Kennedy
went on to state that even if the Court was correct that taxation and bond issuance cannot be
divorced, the Court would still be incorrect because "the discrimination against out-of-state
commerce still would be too plain and prejudicial to be sustained." Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1825
(Kennedy, J. dissenting). For support, Justice Kennedy cited to Justice Alito's dissenting opinion in
United Haulers, which gained support from only three of the Court's nine members. Id.; United
Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1803. Justice Souter wrote that the dissent's attempt to disaggregate the
issuance of bonds and their taxation is a "denial of economic reality." Id. at 1814 n.17 (plurality
opinion).
144. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This, of course, is true with regard to
erecting barriers in the private marketplace. Justice Kennedy cited to a number of cases, all of which
dealt with the state using the taxing power to benefit private in-state businesses. Id. He went on to
state that "[n]othing in our cases even begins to suggest this rule is inapplicable simply because the
State uses a discriminatory tax to favor its own enterprise." Id. Justice Kennedy is correct that at no
time before Davis did the Court hold that a state can use its taxing power in furtherance of traditional
government activities. However, at no time did the Court rule that a state could not use its taxing
power to benefit its own enterprise either. Justice Kennedy's argument can be reduced to the notion
that "because it has never been considered, it can never be." Justice Kennedy is not even entirely
correct in his premise. While the Court has never said a state can use its taxing power to favor its
own enterprise, it has said that a state can use its regulatory power to favor its own enterprise.
United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1790. The incremental step in analysis from regulation to taxation
does not seem as wide a chasm as Justice Kennedy would have us believe.
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free market because the taxing power is at once so flexible and so potent." 45
He next discussed a number of cases, including Boston Stock Exchange,
Bacchus and Fulton, in which the Court held discriminatory taxes to be
invalid pursuant to the negative Commerce Clause.14 6 Justice Kennedy
declared that cases holding discriminatory taxes invalid comprise merely one
subset of the cases in which the Court has invalidated statutes that favor
local interests over interstate commerce.147
Next, the dissent analyzed the Court's reliance on United Haulers in
finding Kentucky's law valid. Justice Kennedy distinguished United

145. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1826 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy does not state exactly
what threat the differential taxation scheme presents to the national free market. Id.
146. Id. at 1825-26. Justice Kennedy first cited Boston Stock Exchange, noting that the Court had
previously "ruled that protectionist, differential taxation with respect to securities sales is invalid."
Id. at 1825 (citing Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977)). In Boston Stock
Exchange, the Court considered a New York statute which taxed out-of-state securities transactions
more heavily than in-state securities transactions. Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 319. The Court
noted that it had not had the opportunity to decide "whether a State may tax in a manner that
discriminates between two types of interstate transactions in order to favor local commercial
interests over out-of-state businesses, but the clear import of our Commerce Clause cases is that such
discrimination is constitutionally impermissible." Id. at 335 (citing Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434,
443 (1880); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935)). Boston Stock Exchange is
clearly not on point with Davis, as in Davis there was no discrimination that favored "local
commercial interests over out-of-state businesses." Id. Quite the contrary, the statute in Davis is
neutral with regard to in-state and out-of-state businesses. Next, Justice Kennedy held up Bacchus
Imports as an example of a case in which a discriminatory tax exemption was struck down. Davis,
128 S. Ct. at 1826 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271
(1984)). However, the application of Bacchus is inappropriate for the same reason that the
application of Boston Stock Exchange is inappropriate. In Bacchus, the Supreme Court struck down
a Hawaii statute that taxed out-of-state private liquor sellers at a higher rate than some in-state
private liquor sellers. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 273. The key distinction, again, was that in Bacchus the
state favored in-state private industry over out-of-state private industry. As such, Bacchus is also
inapplicable to Davis. Finally, Justice Kennedy cited to the case Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner. Davis,
128 S. Ct. at 1826 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In Fulton, the Court looked at a North Carolina scheme
that taxed the value of stocks held by North Carolinians at an inverse proportion to the amount of
business that the company did in the state. Fulton, 516 U.S. at 328. Therefore, if a company did ten
percent of its business in North Carolina, residents of the state who owned the stock would pay tax
on ninety percent of the value. See id. The Court had no trouble finding that the statute was
impermissibly discriminatory because it favored "domestic corporations over their foreign
competitors in raising capital among North Carolina residents." Id. at 333. Sadly for Justice
Kennedy, Fulton must also be found inapplicable because it too deals with discrimination against
private out-of-state business entities for the benefit of private in-state business entities.
147. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1826-27 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy is right that the line
of discriminatory tax cases make up but one part of the Court's jurisprudence holding that a state
may not enact laws to favor local businesses. He again noted a number of cases in which
discrimination in favor of local products was struck down. Id. at 1827 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(citing Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver.
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994);
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269
(1988); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire,
455 U.S. 331 (1982)). Yet, in each case cited, the discrimination was in favor of local private
interests and at the expense of out-of-state private interests.
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Haulers from Davis by stating that in United Haulers, the fact that the

government had a monopoly over the market and thus created
"[n]ondiscrimination" was central to the holding.148 In this way, the dissent
attempted to undercut the Court's reliance on the similarity found in United
Haulers and Davis-the government's involvement in the challenged
scheme. 14 9 Although the dissent continued to reject the holding of United
Haulers, Justice Kennedy concluded that Davis would not fit under the
United Haulers rubric because there was no monopolization of the bond
market by Kentucky.s 0
Justice Kennedy then explored Camps Newfound and its possible
application to this case.'' He stated that in Camps Newfound, the Court had
already rejected "the argument that profit and not-for-profit organizations
should be treated differently with respect to Commerce Clause

148. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1827 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). It is somewhat odd that Justice Kennedy
argued that a state must have a monopoly in order for the rule in United Haulers to apply. In dissent
to United Haulers, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy, argued vehemently against the Court's
holding, saying that the Court had "long ago recognized that the Commerce Clause can be violated
by a law that discriminates in favor of a state-owned monopoly." UnitedHaulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1806
(Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy wrote in Davis that "[n]ondiscrimination, not just state
involvement, was central to the rationale" in United Haulers. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1827 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). He is certainly right that nondiscrimination is important, but it is specifically
nondiscrimination with respect to private entities that is central. The rule as delineated by Chief
Justice Roberts merely provides that states, in favoring themselves, must "treat every private
business, whether in-state or out-of-state, exactly the same." United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1790. Of
course, a state could enact a statute which treats in-state and out-of-state private businesses exactly
the same without monopolizing the market-Kentucky did exactly that with its differential taxation
scheme. Indeed, Justice Kennedy's assertion that the United Haulers decision was premised upon
the belief that there must be a government monopoly could not be more misguided. Chief Justice
Roberts, in replying to a statement made in Justice Thomas's concurrence to UnitedHaulers,wrote:
Justice Thomas is thus wrong in stating that our approach might suggest "a policy-driven
preference for government monopoly over privatization. ... That is instead the
preference of the affected locality here. Our opinion simply recognizes that a law
favoring a public entity and treating all private entities the same does not discriminate
against interstatecommerce as does a lawfavoring local business over all others.
Id at 1796 n.6 (emphasis added).
149. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1827 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
150. Id. It is true that in United Haulers, the government effectively gained a monopoly. See
United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1791-92. However, as previously discussed, the fact that the haulers
had a monopoly was not dispositive of the Court's decision. See supra note 148 and accompanying
text. Justice Kennedy thus erroneously argued that "[t]his case is not an extension of United
Haulers; it is a rejection of its principal rationale-that in monopolizing the local market, the
ordinance applied equally to interstate and local commerce." Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1827 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). The differential taxation scheme successfully treats all in-state and out-of-state
businesses the same without monopolizing the marketplace for bonds.
151. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1827-28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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protection."l 52 Justice Kennedy equated the states with not-for-profit entities
and, for him, it naturally followed that, like the latter, "there is no reason the
governmental character of the bond-issuing enterprise should exclude it from
the coverage of the Commerce Clause."'
The dissent next criticized Justice Souter's discussion of the markets in
which municipal bonds reside.15 4 Justice Kennedy condemned the Court's
dialogue about single state bond funds, arguing that the Court incorrectly
focused on the seller's purposes, rather than on the investors' purposes,
which the dissent considered an erroneous interpretation of negative

152. Id at 1828. Recall that in Camps Newfound, the Court considered a Maine statute that gave
property and personal tax exemptions to charities operating for the benefit of Maine residents.
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 568 (1997); see supra notes
54-58 and accompanying text. The Court struck down the statute, reasoning that under the
Commerce Clause, any supposed difference between for profit and not-for-profit entities is illusory.
Id at 586. Here, Justice Kennedy does find some support. The Court in Camps Newfound went on
to state that the reason why for-profit and not-for-profit organizations must be treated the same is
because they are both "major participants in interstate markets." Id. For other illuminating
discussions on Camps Newfound, see Karin J. Kysilka, A Jurisdictional Vacuum in the Wake of
Camps Newfound/Owatonna?: Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 21 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 288 (1997) (arguing that the Court's invalidation of Maine's tax exemption may have
been beyond the Court's powers); Sara Sachse, United We Stand-But for How Long? Justice
Scalia and New Developments of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 43 ST. LOUis U. L.J. 695 (1999)
(discussing Justice Scalia and his impact on the Court's modem negative Commerce Clause
jurisprudence); Todd Armbruster, Comment, The Proposed Domestic Charity Exception: An Unwise
Addition to the Dormant Commerce Clause Family, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333 (1999) (discussing a
possible domestic charity exception to the negative Commerce Clause in response to Justice Scalia's
dissent); Note, Dormant Commerce Clause-Application to Nonprofit Entities, Ill HARV. L. REV.
197 (1997) (arguing that the Court was correct in not drawing a distinction between for-profit and
not-for-profit entities).
153. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In response, Justice Souter noted that
Camps Newfound is not entirely analogous because there, "the tax exemption was unaccompanied by
any market activity by the State." Id at 1814 n.17 (plurality opinion). He went on to note that the
tax exemption in Camps favored private, albeit not-for-profit, charities, and therefore Davis and
United Haulers remain in line with the holding in Camps Newfound. Id Further, while Justice
Kennedy apparently sees no difference between private not-for-profits and the government, Chief
Justice Roberts aptly distinguished the two in United Haulers. He wrote that "[u]nlike private
enterprise, government is vested with the responsibility of protecting the health, safety, and welfare
of its citizens." United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795. Therefore, "it does not make sense to regard
laws favoring local government and laws favoring private industry with equal skepticism." Id
154. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For a thorough discussion of Justice
Souter's identification of three markets, see supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text. Justice
Kennedy suggested that the Court claimed that because bonds reside in a discrete intrastate market,
the state can discriminate if it wants. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The only
problem is that the Court never stated anything near that. Instead, the Court suggested that "[b]y
definition, there is no discrimination against interstate activity within the market itself." Id. at 1816
(majority opinion). Justice Kennedy further criticized the Court's analysis of the bonds in a discrete
market, saying that such an argument is nowhere to be found in the record. Id. at 1828 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). While he was willing to admit that there is a discrete market with regard to all state
and municipality issued bonds because of L.R.C. § 103(a), he refused to admit that "there are 41
further discrete markets for bonds in each of the separate States that have laws like [Kentucky]." Id
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Commerce Clause jurisprudence."' Justice Kennedy summarized by stating
"[t]he fact that the national market for tax-free state and municipal bonds is a
discrete one serves only to reinforce the point that it should operate without
local restriction."'5
Justice Kennedy found little support for invalidating Kentucky's law by
virtue of the fact that forty-nine other states had joined a brief in support of
Kentucky's position.' He stated that the other states would quite naturally
prefer the discriminatory laws they had also passed and that worked in their
favor.'
The very fact that so many other states had passed differential
taxation schemes was evidence that there has effectively been a trade war, to
the advantage of wealthier states, in direct contradiction to the original intent
of the founders. 59
155. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated that the
investors' purposes "are the touchstone of market definition." Id. His larger point seems to be that
the Kentucky statute should not be saved merely because smaller municipalities would have trouble
financing their projects if the tax exemption were invalidated. Id. He noted that in Bacchus, the
state of Hawaii argued that the tax exemption at issue was merely enacted to help nonexistent and
financially troubled segments of the liquor industry. Id. (citing Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263, 272-73 (1984)). However, as in Bacchus, Justice Kennedy's argument seems to be that a
legitimate end cannot justify an arguably illegitimate means. Therefore, he stated that the case
"cannot be resolved by determining what the issuer does with the proceeds." Id Regardless of
Justice Kennedy's viewpoint, those in the industry insist that "[t]he current municipal bond
marketplace is in part a national market and in part a state by state market." Brief for the National
Federation of Municipal Analysts, as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 102, at 12.
156. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy does not offer any
reasoning as to why, assuming there is discrimination within the discrete national market for bonds,
the market would be better off without that discrimination. Id.
157. Id. Justice Kennedy suggested that the Court has routinely ignored the argument that
because a state's people have chosen to bear the burden of a discriminatory scheme, the scheme
should therefore be upheld. Id. He argued that if the Court allowed a discriminatory law to stand
merely because a state's people were in favor of the law, the Court's entire line of discriminatory tax
cases would be undermined. Id at 1829. The intriguing element in Davis, however, is that the
people are not deciding whether or not they want to accept the costs which will be paid by some
private industry; they are instead deciding whether they want to pay the cost themselves through
decreased tax revenue, ostensibly in exchange for a greater ability to sell municipal bonds and
quickly raise revenue. According to the brief for the forty-nine other states, the people "have chosen
to exempt their own bonds from taxation because it allows them to lower their borrowing costs and
to increase the amount of money available to build schools, hospitals and roads." Brief for the
States, supra note 5, at 10.
158. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy is right to point out that
the advantage is larger for higher-tax states. Id. at 1829. If the tax exemptions were to be
overturned, then the demand for out-of-state bonds would increase "the most in the case of taxpayers
in high tax states, where the tax advantage of buying in-state bonds is currently the highest." Brief
for the National Federation of Municipal Analysts, supranote 102, at 17.
159. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1829 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy seems to suggest that
these taxing statutes are emblematic of the parade of horribles that the founders suggested would
occur if the states were not prevented from erecting trade barriers. The Court in Baldwin v. G.A. F.
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In Part II of the dissent, Justice Kennedy briefly discussed the plurality's
application of the market participant doctrine.160 The dissent paid little
attention to the plurality's discussion, saying it needed "little comment"
because "a 'tax exemption is not the sort of direct state involvement in the
market that falls within the market-participation doctrine."'6 Again, the
disagreement came back to what the actual challenged practice was, with
Justice Kennedy saying that it was clearly taxation, not the issuance of
bonds.162 Because taxation is a regulatory act, the dissent suggested that the
market participant doctrine was inapplicable. 6 1

Seeling, Inc. suggested that the purpose of the Commerce Clause is to prevent "'the mutual
jealousies and aggressions of the States, taking form in customs barriers and other economic
retaliation."' Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). Justice Kennedy suggested
that by allowing the tax exemption to stand here, "the Court invites further erosion of the Commerce
Clause." Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1829. He went on to concoct a wild hypothetical in which states tax
the interest income on out-of-state bonds at a rate of eighty percent. Id Fortunately, in the nearly
one-hundred years that states have been exempting their own bonds from taxation, none has come
even close to sliding down the dastardly slippery slope that Justice Kennedy suggested. In fact, if
we accept the premise that the purpose of the negative Commerce Clause is to prevent the mutual
jealousies and aggressions between the states as the Court suggested in Baldwin, we see that judicial
intervention is needed less here. There is no jealousy between the states in this area. There is no
aggression between the states in this area. Justice Kennedy suggested that the fact that many states
have similar tax exemptions means that their purpose was to enact retaliatory measures. Id. But
again the very fact that every single state is in favor of the tax exemptions is nothing if not proof that
they were not designed to be retaliatory in nature. Justice Kennedy mocked the Court for seeming
"proud to say that New York was the first to enact a protectionist exemption." Id. The Court should
be proud of New York, for the state was the first to take the risk by experimenting with a tax
exemption for bonds issued within the state. As Professors Redish and Nugent have noted, the
benefit of state experimentation through federalism "should be sacrificed only when the negative
impact on the nation's economy is so severe that preemptive congressional action can overcome the
hurdles of political inertia." See Redish, supranote 30, at 573-74.
160. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1829 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
161. Id. (quoting Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 593
(1997)).
162. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1829 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy actually suggested that
Justice Souter was trying to expand the market participant doctrine to include the state acting as a tax
regulator. Id. He stated that if such an expansion were accepted there "would be an open invitation
to enact these kinds of discriminatory laws-laws that, until today, the Court has not upheld in even
a single instance." Id. For more on what the challenged activity was, see supra notes 142-147 and
accompanying text.
163. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1829 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy did make an interesting
argument regarding downstream regulation. He assumed, arguendo, that the challenged activity was
simply the issuance of bonds rather than the taxation of bonds. Id. at 1830. He then implied that if
the state sold bonds but applied a differential taxation scheme to them, the state would be acting as a
downstream regulator. Id. The premise is once again wrong, because as Justice Souter tirelessly
noted, the issuance of the bonds cannot be divorced from the differential tax. Id at 1812 (plurality
opinion). If the market participant doctrine were to be applied, an analysis under downstream
regulation would not yield an unconstitutional statute. Under the downstream regulation rule, "the
Court has refused to find that the state was a market participant when it conditioned sales on the
subsequent behavior of the purchaser." Davis S. Bogen, The Market ParticipantDoctrine and the
Clear Statement Rule, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 543, 544 (2006). For downstream regulation to
invalidate a statute, the state must require that the purchaser of its product do something down the
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In closing, Justice Kennedy suggested that if the real reason the Court
found the law to be valid was because of its fear that finding the law invalid
would cause a massive disruption in the bond market then "there needs to be
a sui generis exception, noting that the interstate discrimination has been
entrenched in many States and for a considerable time."' 64 However,
because the majority failed to do so, Justice Kennedy asserted that the Court
had invited other protectionist laws and unwisely confined the scope of the
Court's negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 165
G. Justice Alito's Dissent

Justice Alito wrote separately to reaffirm his view "that the Court's
established [negative] Commerce Clause precedents should be followed."l 66
He also noted his entire agreement with Justice Kennedy and reiterated his
reasoning for dissenting to United Haulers.'6 7
line, out of privity of contract with the state. Id. There is no such requirement here. Purchasers buy
municipal bonds knowing what the tax consequences will be and, once purchased, the tax structure
does not mandate the purchaser's behavior. If the market participant doctrine were to be
appropriately applied, there would be no downstream regulation on the facts of this case.
164. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1830 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Court did not altogether refute this
assertion. Indeed, Justice Souter suggested that the practical consequences of the decision did play a
role in the opinion. Id. at 1819 n.21 (majority opinion). Justice Souter stated that "practical
consequences have always been relevant in deciding the constitutionality of local tax laws." Id One
interesting question is, what if the practical consequences of finding the differential tax scheme
unconstitutional were not as great? What if the bond market could reorder itself easily and states
and municipalities could easily find their necessary funding another way? This line of reasoning
from Justice Souter almost seems to go back to a no less discriminatory alternative standard. In
neither United Haulers nor Davis did it appear that there was an easier solution to the respective
issues. But if there was a solution that did not cause the haulers' rates to go up, or that did not
"discriminate" against out-of-state municipal bonds, perhaps the Court would have been less willing
to invoke its new civic responsibility exception. On the other hand, creating what would effectively
be a two tiered analysis would muddy an already complex jurisprudence, so the Court might well
prefer to stick with a bright line rule wherein the state or municipality is excepted from negative
Commerce Clause scrutiny as long as the law "favors a traditional government function without any
differential treatment favoring local entities over substantially similar out-of-state interests;" whether
there is a less "discriminatory" alternative available should not be relevant. Id. at 1811.
165. Id. at 1830 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy went on to say that the Court's
opinion will risk "further dislocations and market inefficiencies based on the origin of products and
commodities that should be traded nationwide and without local trade barriers." Id. Unfortunately,
Justice Kennedy never pointed out where the market inefficiency was in differential taxation for
municipal bonds, and he never explained why municipal bonds should be traded nationwide without
"barriers." The evidence suggested that with regard to municipal bonds, the differential tax system
works well. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
166. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1830 (Alito, J., dissenting).
167. Id. In United Haulers, Justice Alito reasoned that the regulations challenged were essentially
the same as those which had been challenged in Carbone,and therefore he saw no reason to reach a
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V.

IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION

A. Legal Impact

The legal importance of Davis should not be understated. With Justice
Souter's statement that "Kentucky's tax exemption favors a traditional
government function without any differential treatment favoring local
entities over substantially similar out-of-state interests," the Court further
entrenched the new civic responsibility exception first applied in United

different result. United Haulers Ass'n, v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct.
1786, 1803 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting). He stated that "[t]he Court relies on the distinction
between public and private ownership to uphold the flow-control laws, even though a
straightforward application of Carbone would lead to the opposite result." Id. at 1804. Justice Alito
may have viewed Carbone as already deciding the public-private issue in a way that found no
meaningful distinction for negative Commerce Clause analysis between privately-owned and
publicly-owned facilities. For example although recognizing that the Court claimed the facility in
Carbone was privately owned, Justice Alito challenged that assertion in United Haulers and stated it
was misleading to call that facility privately-owned. Id. The facts of Carbone show that under the
arrangement between the city of Clarkstown and a private contractor, the contractor promised to
build a waste transfer station at a cost of $1.4 million. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,
511 U.S. 383, 387 (1994). In exchange, the city promised that it would ensure by means of a local
flow control ordinance that the facility received 120,000 tons of waste per year and that the
contractor would be able to charge haulers eighty-one dollars per ton of waste. Id. At the end of
five years, the city would then purchase the facility from the contractor for one dollar. Id. Justice
Alito made much of the fact that the Court stated "[t]he town would finance its new facility with the
income generated by the tipping fees." Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, he stated that "[tlhe only real
difference between the facility at issue in Carbone and its counterpart in this case is that title to the
former had not yet formally passed to the municipality." United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1804 (Alito,
J., dissenting). In his dissent in Carbone, Justice Souter first brought up the public-private
distinction and argued that the facility was essentially public because it "directly aids the
government in satisfying a traditional governmental responsibility" and therefore the flow control
ordinance should not violate the negative Commerce Clause. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts, in his opinion for the Court in United Haulers, noted that the
majority in Carbone did not comment on Justice Souter's dissenting distinction between public and
private entities. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1793. He suggested that the majority's silence as to
the dissent's discussion of the public-private distinction could be viewed in one of two ways. Id.
First, it could be interpreted as the majority thinking that negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence
would remain the same whether a public or a private facility was at issue. Id. Second, the majority's
silence could be viewed as the Court avoiding the issue because it considered the facility in Carbone
to be private, and therefore the issue was not properly before the Court. Id. at 1793-94. Chief
Justice Roberts and the Court in United Haulers adopted the second interpretation, noting that
Justice Souter had provided numerous reasons in his dissent why a public facility should be treated
differently from a private facility and that it would be extremely odd for the Court to reject such an
argument without comment. Id. at 1794; see supra note 63 and accompanying text. Justice Alito
was unable to refute this argument. Instead, he attempted to rewrite the majority's intent in
Carbone,saying that the majority clearly agreed with the dissent that the facility was public, but that
this fact simply did not make a difference in its analysis. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1805. But,
as Chief Justice Roberts noted, if the majority in Carbone agreed with the dissent that the facility
was in fact public, it would be almost inconceivable for the Court to have somehow rejected the
dissent's argument that such a distinction matters for negative Commerce Clause purposes without
ever saying so. Id. at 1794.
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Haulers.168 Davis succeeded in providing some clarity regarding the new
exception. First, the civic responsibility exception can be widely applied. 169
Second, there is no need for the government to monopolize an industry or
sector in order for a challenged law to fit within the exception.7 e However,
while Davis helped to clarify United Haulers, it failed to fully delineate the
scope of the civic responsibility exception."' While it appears that a state or
168. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811. Chief Justice Roberts laid out the first formulation of the rule in
United Haulers. He stated that "laws that favor the government in such areas [traditional
government activities]-but treat every private business, whether in-state or out-of-state, exactly the
same-do not discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the Commerce Clause."
UnitedHaulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1790.
169. Both Carbone and United Haulersdealt with the government's civic responsibility to provide
for waste management. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1790; Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387. However,
Davis makes it clear that States and municipalities are immune from the talons of the negative
Commerce Clause whenever they are providing for the health, safety and welfare of their citizens in
a way that does not advantage private industry. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811. In addition, the holding
in Davis suggests that what might normally appear to be discrimination against other states is not
discrimination for the purposes of the negative Commerce Clause, which is certainly an expanded
understanding in comparison to United Haulers. Professor Williams asserts that the wide
application of the civic responsibility exception is judicial error. Williams, supra note 91, at 467.
He suggests that the UnitedHaulers Court wanted to find the flow control ordinance constitutional,
but, seeing that such a holding could not be made under the Court's current jurisprudence, simply
concocted a new test such that the scheme could be found nondiscriminatory. Id. Due to United
Haulers, he claims that the Court in Davis "was left with no option but to uphold" the differential
taxation scheme, suggesting the Court is now at the mercy of the exception it unwittingly created.
Id. Although Professor Williams's article is otherwise enlightening, his analysis seems hollow here.
His claim essentially boils down to an argument in which the Court in United Haulers wanted so
badly to find the ordinance nondiscriminatory that it was willing to do anything, including creating
an entirely new doctrine just to fulfill its purpose in that one case. If the Court had indeed created an
entirely new doctrine just to allow a couple of counties in New York to control their own waste, it
could have easily distinguished Davis on numerous other grounds and continued to do the same with
similar cases in the future, so as to prevent the entrenchment of the civic responsibility exception and
thereby contain the holding to United Haulers. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1827 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that a monopoly is required for the civic responsibility exception to apply).
Professor Williams also suggests the Court has set the country on a slippery slope in which states
will be able to force all children to attend public schools or force all private businesses to purchase
cement from a state-owned cement facility. Williams, supra note 91, at 468. However, as he goes
on to note, the Court has already invalidated such violations of individual rights. Id at 468 n.228
(citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)). In addition, he suggests that Congress is
somehow incapable of legislating on such topics, ostensibly because it is too busy to be bothered
with its own Constitutional duties, making Article III courts the better option. Id at 468.
Unfortunately, the Constitution does not provide Congress with the ability to delegate its legislating
duties to the judiciary. As Chief Justice Roberts noted, "[r]ecognizing that local government may
facilitate a customary and traditional government function such as waste disposal, without running
afoul of the Commerce Clause, is hardly a prescription for state control of the economy." United
Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1797 n.7.
170. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
171. The problem lies within the ambiguity of the rule fashioned by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Souter. The rule is premised upon a governmental entity performing a traditional
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municipality does not need to fall under the rubric of the market participant
doctrine in order to meet the requirements of the civic responsibility
exception, there remains some disagreement within the Court. 172
Additionally, the outer limits of how far a state or municipality 73 may go to

government function. See United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1790. Chief Justice Roberts easily found
trash disposal to be a traditional government function. Id. Likewise, in Davis, Justice Souter spent
little time arguing that the issuance of bonds was a traditional government function, noting that it
was "a century-old . .. practice." Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811. While trash disposal and providing
funding through the issuance of bonds have clearly been government functions for decades, the
problems are likely to arise at the fringes. For example, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, Justice Blackmun wrote at length about the difficulty in defining a traditional
government function. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538 (1985). He
noted that the Court "find[s] it difficult, if not impossible," to define what is and what is not a
traditional government function. Id. at 539. Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Souter used a
historical analysis to determine that trash disposal and the issuance of bonds were traditional
government functions, but Justice Blackmun argued that there is great confusion with regard to
historical analysis and that the Court "disclaimed a rigid reliance on the historical pedigree of state
involvement in a particular area." Id. at 540. He went on to note that "[t]he most obvious defect of a
historical approach to state immunity is that it prevents a court from accommodating changes in the
historical functions of States." Id. at 543. Justice Alito picked up on this argument in his dissent in
United Haulers, noting that, "to the extent [the] holding rests on a distinction between 'traditional'
governmental functions and their nontraditional counterparts, ... it cannot be reconciled with prior
precedent." UnitedHaulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1810-11 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). This
point by Justice Alito is worthy of further investigation.
172. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. Justice Souter's addition of a market
participant analysis to the facts in Davis seems odd, especially because he noted in the majority
opinion that "[i]t follows afortiorifrom United Haulers that Kentucky must prevail." Davis, 128 S.
Ct. at 1810. Having already decided that Kentucky must win because of the civic responsibility
exception identified in United Haulers, Justice Souter argued that "[t]his case, like United Haulers,
may also be seen under the broader rubric of the market participation doctrine." Id. at 1811.
(plurality opinion). However, United Haulers never considered the market participation doctrine,
and Justice Souter offered no reason as to why it was necessary to apply it in Davis. Chief Justice
Roberts appears to have convinced the Court that a market participation analysis is not necessary in a
civic responsibility exception case. Id. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("A majority of the Court
shares this view.").
173. The Court never explicitly stated that municipalities should fall under the civic responsibility
exception as the states do, but it logically follows that they would. Technically, in both United
Haulers and Davis, the statutes at issue were created by the respective states of New York and
Kentucky. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1804; United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1791. However, in both
cases local municipalities were involved in the alleged discrimination which the Court ultimately
found to not be discrimination at all. There is a parallel with the market participation doctrine,
which does apply to municipalities. In White v. Massachusetts Council of ConstructionEmployers,
the Court considered an executive order from the mayor of Boston which required that all
construction projects paid for with any amount of city funds had to have a work force comprised of
at least 50% Boston residents. White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 205-06
(1983). Then-associate Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, noted that the city easily qualified
as a government entity under the market participant doctrine. Id. at 210 ("If the city is a market
participant, then the Commerce Clause establishes no barrier to conditions such as these which the
city demands for its participation. Impact on out-of-state residents figures in the equation only after
it is decided that the city is regulating the market rather than participating in it, for only in the former
case need it be determined whether any burden on interstate commerce is permitted by the
Commerce Clause.").
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provide for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens will have to be
defined in future cases.
Due to the lack of clarity with regard to the civic responsibility
exception's scope, uncertainty about the constitutionality of tax-exempt
private activity bonds will linger. 174 As noted earlier, Justice Souter declined
to discuss whether state tax exemptions for in-state private activity bonds
violate the negative Commerce Clause.' Assuming Camps Newfound and
Carbone are still good law-and based upon United Haulers and Davis,

there is no reason to believe otherwise-the Court should hold that a
differential taxation scheme for private activity bonds violates the negative
Commerce Clause.17 6 However, until the Court has the opportunity to
confront this issue, confusion will reign in the bond market.17
174. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Under the Internal Revenue Code, a private
activity bond is a bond from which, "(1) more than 10% of the proceeds are to be used by any
private business, and (2) more than 10% of principal or interest on the bonds is repaid from, or
secured by, private business money or property." Michael Livingston, Reform or Revolution? TaxExempt Bonds, the Legislative Process, and the Meaning of Tax Reform, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1165, 1207 (1989). Private activity bonds "are issued to provide governmental financing to nongovernmental entities or persons conducting activities that the state legislature has determined serve
a public purpose." Brief for the National Federation of Municipal Analysts, supra note 102, at 6.
175. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Some in the academic community have declined
to even opine an opinion as to how the Court will eventually decide the issue, as the analysis remains
muddled. See Dormant Commerce Clause, supra note 11, at 285 ("[T]he analysis of the tax
treatment of private activity bonds is complicated by the presence of private entities acting as
intermediaries between the government and the creation of public goods, and thus it is unclear how
the Court will rule when and if it is faced with a constitutional challenge to that differential tax
treatment.").
176. There is no doubt that private activity bonds do benefit local populations. They often fund a
number of important facilities and projects including:
[F]ederally-insured or state-authorized student loans for higher education; low-income or
mixed-income housing; hospitals, nursing homes, assisted living and other health care
facilities; schools, colleges, and universities; museums; social services agencies; solid
waste disposal facilities; airports; docks and wharves; mass commuting facilities; sewage
facilities; facilities for the furnishing of water or the local furnishing of electric energy or
gas; local district heating or cooling facilities; hazardous waste facilities; high-speed
intercity rail facilities; environmental enhancements of hydroelectric generating facilities;
small manufacturing facilities and so-called "Liberty Bonds" issued to rebuild the areas
devastated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Brief for the National Federation of Municipal Analysts, supra note 102, at 6. While the tax
exemptions for the bonds help to build projects that eventually lead to a public benefit, the Court's
jurisprudence indicates that such an indirect public benefit might not be enough for negative
Commerce Clause purposes. Consider Camps Newfound, where the Court invalidated the Maine
Camps
statute providing tax exemptions for charities that favored in-state residents.
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 568-71 (1997). Justice Scalia argued
in his dissent that the "tax exemption, which excuses from taxation only that property used to relieve
the State of its burden of caring for its residents, survives even our most demanding Commerce
Clause scrutiny." Id. at 595-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia noted, providing such an
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Yet, Davis did more than help entrench and expand a new exception to
the negative Commerce Clause. Justice Souter's opinion in Davis shows
that the battle against retaining Pike balancing as part of the Court's negative
Commerce Clause jurisprudence remains ongoing.' 78 Specifically, the Court
has shown a complete unwillingness to even engage in balancing when
confronted with an economic issue.179 While Pike technically remains a part
exemption would not "place the 'national market' in any peril." Id. at 601 n. 1. Certainly the tax
exemption for charitable non-profits is very similar in effect to private activity bonds for
organizations and projects, in that both help a state to fulfill its civic responsibilities. However, the
majority disagreed with Justice Scalia in Camps Newfound, arguing that the case was simply one of
protectionism and that Congress would be the more appropriate body to make such an exception. Id.
at 588. Carbone is also instructive. Although the Court did not cast its decision in terms of the
public-private distinction, the arrangement in Carbone was in many ways similar to a private
activity bond. The government offered a contractor a benefit (the flow control ordinance for five
years) in exchange for building a facility that helped relieve the city of its civic responsibilities. C &
A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386-87 (1994). Likewise, a private activity
bond offers a builder/organization a benefit (lower interest rates on bonds through tax exemptions) in
exchange for building something that helps relieve a city or state of its civic responsibilities. The
Court in Carbone rejected the ordinance because "[t]he Commerce Clause presumes a national
market free from local legislation that discriminates in favor of local interests." Id. at 393. A private
activity bond does not neatly fit into Chief Justice Roberts's formulation of the civic responsibility
exception in that the Court specifically referenced that it was the government which the law must
directly favor. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1790 ("[L]aws that favor the government in such
areas-but treat every private business, whether in-state or out-of-state, exactly the same-do not
discriminate against interstate commerce . . . ."). The purpose of the private activity bond is to favor
an entity other than the government. There is a corollary with the market participant doctrine, the
Court's other main exception to the negative Commerce Clause. In South-Central Timber
Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, Justice White penned a very influential plurality. S.-Cent. Timber
Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97 (1984) (White, J., plurality). He noted that the Court had
previously decided that, "[tihe market-participant doctrine permits a State to influence 'a discrete,
identifiable class of economic activity in which [it] is a major participant."' Id. (quoting White v.
Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7 (1983)). Justice White then stated
that, "[t]he limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it allows a State to impose burdens
on commerce within the market in which it is a participant, but allows it to go no further." Id. at 97.
Therefore, a state cannot enact downstream regulation that allows it to control the market indirectly.
See id Based upon the general contours of the market participant doctrine, in which the government
must be the actor, and upon the holdings of Camps Newfound, Carbone, and United Haulers, the
Court should find that private activity bonds violate the negative Commerce Clause and are not
saved by the civic responsibility exception.
177. See Dormant Commerce Clause, supra note 11, at 286 ("Market participants likely will (and
should) remain conscious of the continued susceptibility of a significant portion of the municipal
debt market to a constitutional challenge because an upheaval in the private activities bond market
would have far-reaching and detrimental economic consequences in an already volatile market
environment.").
178. See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
179. Justice Souter cited to General Motors v. Tracy for the generally accepted proposition that
the Court is not well suited to make economic decisions. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1818 (citing Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 281-82 (1997)). In Tracy, the Court considered an Ohio
statute which imposed the state's "general sales and use taxes on natural gas purchases from all
sellers, whether in-state or out-of-state, except regulated public utilities that meet Ohio's statutory
definition of a 'natural gas company."' Tracy, 519 U.S. at 281-82. In deciding the negative
Commerce Clause claim, the Court stated that it was ill-qualified to make judgments about economic
effects due to a lack of training, resources, and available information. Id. at 308-09. Justice Souter
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of the Court's negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it might as well be
gone-the Court has not invalidated a law by utilizing Pike since 1982.s0
B. BroadImpact

The immediate result of Davis is that states can continue to sell bonds at
a reduced interest rate by utilizing a differential income tax scheme.
Although states may actually lose money by utilizing this form of
financing,'81 it remains vitally important as a way to finance projects over
time 18 2 and to help smaller municipalities get funding for important local
projects.'83 The upheaval of the current municipal bond system would have

closed by noting that ."[t]he Constitution gives [Congress] the power to regulate commerce among
the states, and until it acts I think we should enter the field with extreme caution."' Id. at 310
(quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 302 (1944) (concurring opinion)). Given
that Pike is only applied when analyzing a case under the negative Commerce Clause, and many
negative Commerce Clause cases deal with heady economic issues, it seems fair to say Pike retains
extremely little utility. However, when the Court does want to analyze under Pike, it simply avoids
a discussion of economics in the balancing analysis. For example, in United Haulers, Chief Justice
Roberts, in a plurality part of the opinion, discussed Pike balancing, but kept the discussion couched
in terms of the prospective health and environmental benefits while largely avoiding an in-depth
discussion of the degree to which the ordinance was simply a financing measure. United Havlers,
127 S. Ct. at 1797 (Roberts, C.J., plurality).
180. David S. Day, The "Mature" Rehnquist Court and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine:
The Expanded DiscriminationTier, 52 S.D. L. REV. 1, 50 (2007) ("Another remarkable feature of
the end of the Rehnquist Court was that, although the doctrine had two tiers, the Court had chosen to
decide cases only on the discrimination tier. The nondiscrimination tier [Pike] had fallen into rather
obvious non-use."). The last law invalidated under Pike was in the 1982 case Edgar v. MITE Corp.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (1) CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (2) ExtraterritorialState
Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1865, 1868 n.18 ("In Edgar v. MITE Corp. there was one brief
section of White's opinion, the section on Pike-based balancing, that received five votes and thereby
became technically the opinion of the Court." (citation omitted)). In Edgar, MITE challenged an
Illinois statute that required target companies (takeover candidates which had at least ten percent of
their shares owned by Illinois shareholders) to register any takeover offer with the Illinois Secretary
of State. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 626-27. While the statute was not per se discriminatory, the Court
ruled that the "burden the Act imposes on interstate commerce is excessive in light of the local
interests," because the Illinois Secretary of State effectively had the power to block a nationwide
tender offer. Id. at 640-43.
181. The brief for the states notes that when a state enacts a differential income tax on municipal
bonds, it misses out on tax revenues it otherwise would have received. Brief for the States, supra
note 5, at 2-3.
182. Attaway, supra note 1, at 740-41 ("Although states could use general tax revenues to finance
capital protects, they tend instead to use debt in order to spread the costs of capital projects across all
those who will benefit from them over time.").
183. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
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wreaked havoc on states' financing at a time when budgets across the
country are already in dire trouble. 184
However, the confusion with regard to private activity bonds remains
troubling. If tax exemptions for private activity bonds are found to be
unconstitutional, the projects they usually fund could have severe trouble
gaining alternative financing.' 85 This could create substantial upheaval in
the bond market and further damage the economy.
Additionally, the broad impact of this decision should not be couched in
merely financial terms. This decision is also allows states to become more
active in seeking solutions to their citizens' problems.18 6 States will regain
confidence in their role as experimenters within the federal system.'5 8 Ideas
184. See Brief for the States, supra note 5, at 1. The states argued that if Kentucky had lost the
case there would have been, "staggering potential liability." Id. This was because of claims which
citizens would make against the states demanding that their taxes be refunded and because of the
loss of revenue from taxing out-of-state bonds going forward. Id. For example, New York alone
estimated that it would owe $200 million in refunds to its taxpayers. Id. at 17. The states would not
be able to remedy the problem by retroactively taxing citizens who had not previously paid tax on
in-state bonds because of both constitutional and political issues. Id. at 16-17 (noting that
"numerous States have state constitutional provisions that preclude their legislature from taxing their
own State's bonds").
185. See supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text.
186. One such experiment was started by the State of New York in 1997. Amy Remus Scott, A
Commerce Clause Challenge to New York's Tax Deduction for Investment in Its Own Tuition
Savings Program, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 379, 380 (1999). Pursuant to Section 529(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code, states can create qualified state tuition programs, which exempt all non-distributed
earnings from federal income taxation. Id. at 379-80. New York created such a program and
allowed a state tax deduction for some of the money contributed to its plan but did not allow a
deduction for money contributed to the plans of other states. Id. at 381. The author argued that the
plan was a clear violation of the negative Commerce Clause. Id. at 382. While this was a reasonable
conclusion at the time the article was written in 1999, it is clear that the conclusion is no longer
correct. New York's tuition savings program is based on an extremely similar model to a
differential income tax for in-state municipal bonds. The key here is that the state is favoring a
traditional government function, which education most certainly is, and doing so in a manner
without treating in-state and out-of-state private interests differently. Prior to Davis, there may have
been an argument that the program was still discriminatory because it favored New York's program
over the programs created by other states; however Davis makes clear that for negative Commerce
Clause purposes, when states are engaging in traditional government functions, the only requirement
is that they treat in-state and out-of-state private interests the same. See Brief for the States, supra
note 5, at 32.
187. Many still consider the states' role as experimenters within the federalist system to be vital.
For example, William H. Pryor Jr., Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, argues that "[w]hen the states are allowed to experiment, regulatory failures can be confined
to smaller communities and contrasted with regulatory successes. A regulatory failure on a national
scale, instead of a failure confined to a state, reveals the risk of tyranny that federalism prevents."
William H. Pryor Jr., Federalism and Freedom, 83 TuL. L. REV. 585, 590 (2008) (reviewing ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2008)).
Certainly, the civic responsibility exception which the Court has outlined allows states the
opportunity to conduct the very kinds of regulatory experiments to which Judge Pryor refers. If a
state is successful, other states can adopt the regulation. If the state fails, the problem is confined to
only one of the fifty states. Judge Pryor thus went on to note that "[w]hen I proposed laws as a state
attorney general, I often surveyed the laws of other states to learn what worked and what policy
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that work can be adopted by other states, just as New York's differential tax
scheme for municipal bonds has been adopted by other states seeking
flexible financing options for large projects.'
VI.

CONCLUSION

Davis, in tandem with UnitedHaulers, marks the first significant change
to the Court's negative Commerce Clause analysis since the introduction of
Pike nearly forty years ago. However, the impact of Davis may not be fully
realized for many years. The Court has shown an increasing tendency to shy
away from invalidating laws under the negative Commerce Clause, and the
new civic responsibility exception shows that there is growing support in the
Court to attack the doctrine in piecemeal fashion.
Advocates of states' rights will claim victory in Davis, but the opinion
should not be read so narrowly. Far from lessening the power of the federal
government over the states, the Court merely noted the importance of states
having the capacity to act when Congress does not dictate otherwise. In so
doing, the Court merely reaffirmed which branch should regulate state action
in the commercial sphere, as nothing in the opinion restricts Congress's
ability to regulate state waste disposal methods, state differential income tax
laws, or any other traditional government function.
Although a great deal remains unsettled, this much is clear-the states,
with their newly found freedom to act, can once again become the great
experimenters the founders envisioned they would be. As Justice O'Connor
once stated, such freedom allows "for the possibility that 'a single
courageous State may, if its citizens chose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.""
Ryan D. Wheeler*

would best suit my state." Id at 592.

188. Judge Pryor notes that he "know[s] from experience that state competition and
experimentation is a real and beneficial phenomenon." Pryor, supra note 187, at 592-93.
189. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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